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Abstract
In this paper, I empirically investigate how the openness of political institutions
to diverse representation can impact conflict-related violence. Regression discontinuity
estimates that exploit plausibly exogenous variations in the number of councillors in
Colombian municipalities show that political openness substantially decreases conflict-
related violence, namely the killing of civilian non-combatants. Empirical evidence
suggests that the lower level of political violence stems from parties with close links to
armed groups having greater representation on larger municipal councils. Using data
about the types of violence employed by these groups, and government representation,
I argue that armed violence has decreased not because of power-sharing arrangements
involving armed groups linked to the parties with more political representation, but
rather because armed groups with more political power deter other groups from initi-
ating certain types of violence.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H72, D72
Keywords: Political openness, armed conflict, municipal councils
∗Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. An earlier draft of this paper was circulated under the title “Political
Representation and Armed Conflict: Evidence from Local Councils in Colombia”. I thank seminar participants
at several seminars; the hospitality of the Barcelona Institute for Political Economy and Governance (IPEG),
where part of this paper was written; and Francesc Amat, Enriqueta Aragones, Laia Balcells, Carles Boix,
Filipe Campante, Francesco Drago, Ruben Durante, Ruben Enikolopov, Donald Green, Jens Hainmueller,
Raphael Godefroy, Gonzalo Hernandez, Paula Herrera, David Karp, Sebastian Lavezzolo, Marta Misas, Juan
Morales, Suresh Naidu, Daniele Paserman, Maria Petrova, Vincent Pons, Didac Queralt, Marta Reynal-
Querol, Alessandro Riboni, Andrea Saenz, Shanker Satyanath, James Snyder, Mathias Thoenig, Leonard
Wantchekon Noam Yuchtman and four anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Any
remaining errors are my own.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
03
71
2v
2 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  1
1 A
ug
 20
20
1 Introduction
In this paper, I empirically investigate the micro-level causal impact that political insti-
tutions being more open to direct representation from diverse groups (what I call “political
openness”) has on conflict-related violence. Insofar as the level of openness of the political
systems is an institutional component of democracy, studying its effects on armed conflict
can shed light on the pacifying effects of democracy.1
The study focuses on Colombia, a country with serious deficiencies in the state’s capacity
to control violence, but which remains a democracy with regular free elections. This makes
Colombia an ideal laboratory for studying the relationship between political openness and
conflict.
The study begins by isolating plausibly exogenous variations in the level of openness of
political institutions in medium and large Colombian municipalities. To do this, I exploit
arbitrary discontinuities in the number of councillors for a municipality. By law, the number
of municipal councillors is based on arbitrary population thresholds. Under certain condi-
tions, municipalities with a population just below a given threshold can serve as a reasonable
counterfactual for municipalities with a population just above the threshold.2
Scholars have paid considerable attention to the size of councils, and of elected bodies in
general,3 and have associated this factor with the degree of openness of such bodies to the en-
try of political parties: the greater the number of representatives, the greater the probability
that more groups in the population will be directly represented. I provide regression discon-
tinuity (RD) estimates suggesting that adding two additional seats to a municipal council
leads, on average, to the election of 1.1 more political parties. The effect is meaningful, given
that the average number of parties per council in the sample is 5.
I use the exogenous discontinuity in the number of councillors to study violence and armed
conflict. RD estimates show that the probability of a conflict-related homicide occurring
during a council’s term is 4.6 percentage points lower in municipalities with larger councils.4
This is a large effect, since 14% of municipality-periods in the sample experienced at least one
conflict-related homicide during the period covered by the study. These results are robust to
alternative specifications, samples, and to the use of the conflict-related homicide rate rather
than the extensive margin.
Several mechanisms may explain these results. I focus on one that I believe to be the
most plausible: larger municipal councils decrease conflict-related violence because they lead
to more representation for parties with links with one non-state armed group, which increases
1The term “political openness” is already used in the literature on democracy, within the theoretical
framework of “political opportunity structure” (Kitschelt, 1986). Kitschelt’s notion of political openness
differs from this study, where political openness is limited to the institutional structure (while the notion
of political opportunity structure takes into account the whole political context). In this respect, political
openness in this paper can be understood as a “component of democracy” (see Coppedge et al., 2011).
2See Eggers et al. (2018) for a review of the literature using regression discontinuity designs based on
population thresholds and a discussion of the potential pitfalls.
3See for instance Spinoza, (PT, chap. VIII); Rousseau, (SC, III); Madison, (Fed, 10 & 55); Brutus, (Letter
No. 3); Buchanan and Tullock (1962, chap. 15) and Waldron (1999).
4Conflict-related homicide is defined as the intentional killing of civilian non-combatants, which typically
occurs when an armed group enters a village and executes one or more pre-identified inhabitants.
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its coercive power and deters its enemies from carrying out selective killings. This mechanism,
which I call the “deterrence hypothesis,” is related to the literature on the consolidation of
power and monopoly on violence (see Olson, 1993; Bates et al., 2002; North et al., 2009;
Acemoglu et al., 2013; Powell, 2013).
I examine the plausibility of this hypothesis in several ways. First, I show that political
parties that allegedly support the interests of right-wing paramilitaries have more direct
representation on larger municipal councils. RD estimates document that adding two seats
to a municipal council increases by 28.6 percentage points the probability that a party with
paramilitary links will have at least one seat. Conversely, the estimates show no evidence of
an effect on the political representation of left-wing parties. Second, I show that the effect of
a larger council on selective killings is larger for those municipalities with paramilitary-linked
parties, and that in municipalities where paramilitaries do not have political representation,
the effect is not statistically different from zero. Third, I show the decrease in conflict-related
homicides is larger for very selective killings (four or fewer deaths per event), but almost
nonexistent for massacres (the execution of many people at the same time). Four, using
data from an alternative source, I show that in municipalities with larger councils, left-wing
guerrillas are the armed armed groups that reduce conflict-related violence the most.
I conclude by analyzing the potential incentives for paramilitaries to increase their coercive
power, and the effect that the increase in paramilitary coercive power may have on the level
of political openness of the municipal councils in other elections. While I do not find evidence
of rent extraction, I find that when there are more councillors from paramilitary groups,
the percentage of votes obtained by left-wing parties in the next election for the Colombian
Senate is lower. Importantly, this result suggests that over time, political openness may
have the somewhat paradoxical effect of making democracy less open by allowing right-wing
paramilitary groups to have more political representation.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the vast con-
flict literature by providing new and well-identified evidence about the effects of democratic
institutions on violence and armed conflict. As previously mentioned, at the broad level of
cross-country correlates, there is evidence that the openness of a political system can influ-
ence the probability of civil wars and political violence (see Reynal-Querol, 2002a, 2005). A
smaller set of studies focuses on subnational variation, studying the role of income shocks,
climate shocks and the size of the franchise on conflict (see Dube and Vargas, 2013; Harari
and La Ferrara, 2013; Fergusson and Vargas, 2013). To my knowledge, no study has exam-
ined the impact of increased political openness on conflict-related violence at the subnational
level.5
My findings echo the logic of violence proposed by Kalyvas (2006): civil wars involve not
just armed actors but also civilians, and the degree of control an armed group has over a
5Perhaps the closest contribution to this paper is Fergusson and Vargas (2013). They also study the effect
of one aspect of democracy (in their case, the size of the franchise) on conflict. Using Colombian subnational
data from 1821-1885, they find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised experienced fewer
violent political battles. Three important differences are that i) they focus on the size of the franchise, which
is different from political openness, ii) they focus on a different period and a different type of conflict, and iii)
by using more recent and better conflict data (which allows me to identify types of violence and perpetrators),
I can shed more light on the mechanisms through which democracy affects violence.
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territory is crucial in determining the intensity of violence directed toward the territory’s
inhabitants. I provide well-identified evidence in favor of one of Kalyvas’s key predictions:
the higher the level of control, the less likely that selective violence will occur.
My empirical evidence comes from a single country. Therefore, I use caution in making
claims about external validity. Nonetheless, I believe that the political mechanisms and
empirical evidence presented in this paper are useful in understanding the effects of increasing
the degree of political openness of elected bodies. At the very least, the empirical evidence
showing that larger local councils are more open to the entry of political parties can be
generalized to other countries and other elected bodies. Although the conclusions about the
impact of greater participation of parties with paramilitary links in local government and
about the reduction of conflict-related violence may be specific to Colombia, other countries
appear to have or could have similar experiences with non-state armed groups in politics.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Colombian
armed conflict and the country’s local institutions. The data and empirical strategy are
discussed in Section 3. The main results are presented in Section 4. Possible mechanisms are
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
Colombian Armed Conflict and Violence
Colombia has suffered one of the world’s longest-running internal conflicts. The conflict
has its roots in struggles for land ownership rights, political exclusion, and weak institutions
(Sanchez, 2001). Its persistence has been explained as the result of international influences
and drug trafficking (Deas, 2015), as well as the decentralization of local politics and public
spending (Sanchez and Palau, 2006). The start of the conflict coincided with the founding of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which was always Colombia’s largest
and best-equipped rebel group. The FARC was never affiliated with either of Colombia’s
main political parties, but was ideologically aligned with the Communist Party (see Palacios
and Safford 2002, p. 355 and GMH 2013b, p. 62). Other armed groups have participated in
Colombia’s conflict, including smaller left-wing insurgents and several right-wing paramilitary
groups. Some authors have associated the origin of the paramilitary groups with local elites
and drug cartels that faced threats of kidnapping and extortion from the guerrillas and
felt betrayed by the central government’s favorable view of political competition, agrarian
reforms and peace talks (Romero, 2005; Gutierrez and Baron, 2005; Lopez, 2010). In 1997,
paramilitary factions formed a national coalition called the United Self-Defense Groups of
Colombia (AUC). Its creation considerably increased the effectiveness of the paramilitaries
and, as a result, the guerrilla groups were driven out of large areas of the country. During this
period of paramilitary expansion (1998 to 2002), violence associated with the conflict escalated
dramatically. In 2002, with the arrival of a new president who eventually offered de-facto
amnesty to paramilitaries, the level of violence began to decline, and by the end of the 2000s,
the severity of the conflict decreased significantly. In July 2016, the Colombian government
and the FARC signed a historic peace deal, which earned then-Colombian President Juan
Manuel Santos the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize.
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Colombian civilians have routinely been the target of massacres, selective assassinations,
kidnappings and forced displacement. The Historical Memory Group (Grupo de Memoria
Histo´rica, or “GMH”), an independent group of academics created by the central government
to record the history of the armed conflict, estimates that the conflict claimed at least 220,000
lives. Civilians accounted for about 81% of this number (GMH, 2013a).
Civilian victims died in different ways. The GMH classifies civilian deaths into two main
categories: intentional killings in which an armed group enters a village and executes one or
several pre-determined inhabitants, and unplanned deaths that occurred as a result of another
action. The GMH documents at least 26,380 intentional killings from 1981 to 2012, affecting
approximately 82% of Colombian municipalities. Intentional killings escalated at the end of
the 1990s and peaked in 2000.
Colombian Local Institutions
Colombia has a long democratic tradition with almost no legacy of dictatorship. This
contrasts with most other Latin American countries, which were led by dictators between the
1960s and 1990s. The armed conflict obviously damaged the nation’s political institutions.
However, even when violence peaked at the end of the 1990s, democratic institutions did
not collapse. Regular free elections (at least on paper) for political office, including local
governments, has been the norm for more than two decades.6
At the local level, the fundamental administrative unit is the municipality, of which there
were 1,102 as of June 2015. National laws that apply equally to all municipalities regulate
elections and the duties of elected officials. Municipalities are governed by a mayor and a
council elected by popular vote for a four-year term.7 Municipal governments are responsible
for providing certain public goods related to education, health and infrastructure.8
A key function of a municipal council is to approve proposals brought forward by the
mayor.9 In practice, however, councils have a limited role in policymaking, with mayors being
the key players. Despite these limitations, the municipal council is an important mechanism
for the interplay of significant political forces, and an instrument used by the de facto local
powers to gain visibility and increase their control over municipalities.10
Councillors are elected using a multi-member single-district system.11 According to the
national electoral law, the size of municipal councils is determined by population. As shown
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1, council sizes range from seven members for municipali-
ties with 5,000 or fewer people, to 21 members for municipalities with more than 1 million
6See Gutierrez (2019), who argues that electoral competition during this period was firmly established (p.
257-258), and served as a constraint on paramilitary groups (p. 370).
7From 1993 to 2004, mayors and councillors were elected for a three-year term.
8Municipal budgets do not include police or military expenditures.
9According to Article 313 of the Colombian Constitution, the key responsibilities of municipal councils are
the regulation of the delivery of public services; the supervision of contracts made by the mayor; the approval
of local taxes and expenditures; the determination of the structure of the municipal administration, including
salary scales; and the regulation of land use.
10One example is how the municipal council facilitates a mechanism called Cabildo abierto (consultative
public assembly): a public council meeting where citizens can participate directly in the discussion of com-
munity affairs (see Law 134 of 1994).
11The seats are allocated using the D’Hondt formula, with a minimum threshold of 3%.
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residents. The population data used to determine the number of councillors is based on the
central government’s administrative records. Two or three months before an election, the
National Department of Statistics sends the latest census data to electoral authorities, and
these officials designate the number of people to be elected to each municipal council.
It is important to note that, to the best of my knowledge, the population thresholds used
to determine municipal council size are not used for any other relevant policy purpose. The
only relevant mechanism that might use the thresholds as an input is categorization (catego-
rizacio´n), a process where municipalities are divided into seven groups, primarily according
to their freely disposable revenue (essentially, current revenue excluding transfers and ear-
marked revenues).12 At the municipal level, categorization determines the salaries of the
mayor, councillors and administrative staff; sets general administrative expenditure limits;
and regulates entitlements to special transfers from the central government. The law on
categorization (Law 617 of 2000) specifies population thresholds, some of which align with
those used to designate the size of municipal councils. However, according to Law 617, these
thresholds are second-tier conditions and irrelevant in practice.13 In Section 3, I verify that
this is indeed the case by showing that municipalities’ categories and spending (which are
positively correlated with municipal salaries and administrative expenditures) vary smoothly
around population thresholds.
Representative Institutions and Non-State Armed Actors
During the armed conflict in Colombia, the relationship between non-state armed actors
and representative institutions progressed through different phases. The most relevant phase
for this paper occurred during the 1990s and coincided with the creation of the AUC. This
unification of paramilitary groups signaled an important change. An uncoordinated strategy
of influencing politics by sponsoring particular local politicians from the two traditional par-
ties was replaced by a strategic decision to influence politics directly and in a coordinated
way at all levels of government (see Romero, 2005, pp. 245-246 and Lopez, 2010, p. 43). This
strategy resulted in a series of secret cooperation agreements between the AUC and a large
number of politicians calling for the “refounding of the nation.” Tellingly, these agreements
12See Law 617 of 2000. Other policies that in some way use population thresholds — in particular the
100,000 threshold — are: (i) eligibility to have local fiscal oversight institutions (also in Law 617 of 2000), (ii)
eligibility for independent education managing institutions (Decree 3940 of 2007), and (iii) a requirement to
have more elaborate land-use plans (Law 388 of 1997). I thank a referee for helping me to identify two of these
policies. The most relevant of the three policies to this paper is likely the first. However, and importantly,
the only scenario in which the 100,000 threshold (and not the municipal category) affects eligibility for local
fiscal oversight institutions is if the municipality falls into the second category and has a population of at least
100,000 (see Article 156 of the Law 617 of 2000). During the period studied, 23 municipalities satisfy these
two conditions, of which only two have a population close to one of the thresholds also used to determine the
size of a council (i.e. the 100,000 threshold). In Web Appendix B, I show that all the main results are robust
to excluding not only these 2 (or 23) municipalities, but all the municipalities for which the council size is
determined by the 100,000 threshold.
13According to paragraph 1 of Article 6, if a municipality falls into one category based on population and
a different category based on freely disposable revenue, the municipality must be classified according to its
revenue. Thus, for 100% of municipalities, the category is based on freely disposable revenue. In fact, during
the period studied, approximately 60% of municipalities would fall into a different category if only population
were taken into account.
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implied the capture, co-optation or creation of smaller parties. These agreements came to
light in 2006, when the recovered laptop of a paramilitary leader was found to contain de-
tails of the “para-political” connections. This discovery launched an investigation known as
parapolitics, which by 2012 had resulted in the prosecution of at least 470 municipal mayors
and councillors, and the imprisonment of 51 congressmen (see Fiscalia, 2012; Verdad Abierta,
2012; Indepaz, 2012; MOE, 2013).
The AUC strategy of capturing the political system contrasted with that of the FARC,
which changed its approach around the same time: instead of sponsoring specific candi-
dates from a few left-wing parties, the FARC started a campaign to sabotage local elections.
From its founding until 1997, the FARC supported and collaborated with a small number of
ideologically similar political parties. Initially, collaboration was limited to the Colombian
Communist Party (see GMH, 2013b, pp. 90-95). In 1985, collaboration expanded to include
the Patriotic Union (UP), a national leftist party founded by the FARC as part of a first
attempt at peace negotiations with the Colombian government (see GMH, 2013b, pp. 157-
162). After numerous violent attacks and assassinations of UP members, the FARC changed
its strategy and began a hostile campaign against elected representatives (see GMH, 2013b,
pp. 257-267). The hostilities, which peaked at the end of the 1990s, not only entailed promot-
ing voter abstention (a strategy that had been used previously) but also actively obstructing
the electoral process. The hostilities were accompanied by a series of mechanisms through
which the FARC, although without a “proper” party, tried to co-opt local political institu-
tions (see GMH, 2013b, pp. 256-257). In the mid-2000s, the FARC moderated its attacks on
the electoral process, reverting to social mobilization and political campaigning (see GMH,
2013b, p. 275 and Avila and Velasco, 2012, p. 385).
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
My analysis uses data on armed conflict, council size and electoral outcomes in Colombian
municipalities. The data on armed conflict comes from two main sources. The first is the
GMH, which, as previously mentioned, is an independent group of academics created by the
Colombian government to produce a historical account of the armed conflict. In its final
report, the GMH presented a series of datasets on the extent of violence during much of the
conflict period (from the early 1980s to early 2010s).14 Covering several types of conflict-
related violence and focusing on civilian victims, the data is based on reports from a network
of Catholic non-governmental organizations. These reports describe incidents of political
violence in nearly every municipality in the country (including those in remote regions).
These Catholic organizations are regarded as neutral actors in the conflict, which minimizes
concerns about potential over-reporting of violence perpetrated by a particular faction.15
14This data can be found at http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/
informeGeneral/basesDatos.html.
15Their data collection framework includes internationally accepted definitions derived from human rights
law and international humanitarian law. For more about this source, see CINEP (2008).
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The GMH classifies the killings of civilians in two main categories: intentional and un-
planned killings. Intentional killings occur, for example, when an armed group enters a village
and executes a particular villager (or villagers) perceived to be sympathetic to the opposing
side. Unplanned killings are civilian deaths that occur as a result of another action (such
as the bombing of an infrastructure or military target). As previously mentioned, in this
paper I focus on intentional killings. To be classified by the GMH as intentional, a killing
has to satisfy the following conditions: the victim(s) was killed in a state of helplessness, the
perpetrator was an identified armed group or an identified group using weapons and wearing
uniforms, and the victim was a social leader or an activist identified as a target by a non-state
armed group. It is important to note that this category excludes deaths caused by mines,
terrorist attacks, murders associated with the drug trade, murders suspected to have been
carried out for personal reasons, and murders committed by vigilantes, social cleansing groups
or gangs.16
The GMH data provides a very thorough account of conflict-related violence in Colombia.
However, two drawbacks are that information on the perpetrators of the killings is very impre-
cise, and that observations have not been systematically cross-checked against other sources.
To mitigate concerns about the quality of GMH data, I also use data from the Conflict Anal-
ysis Resource Center (CERAC). CERAC is a private research organization that specializes
in data-intensive studies of conflict and criminal violence. Like the GMH data, the CERAC
data includes information about violent episodes in almost all Colombian municipalities over
a lengthy period. Importantly, this data also includes information from reports prepared by
the network of Catholic organizations mentioned above. However, the CERAC data also use
media reports from several major newspapers, and events are cross-checked with several other
sources.17 The CERAC data focuses on attacks and clashes between groups, which includes
the bombing of pipelines, bridges and other infrastructure targets; the destruction of police
stations and military bases; and ambushes of military convoys.18
The data on the size of municipal councils and electoral outcomes comes from the Colom-
bian Electoral Agency. For council size, I have created a new dataset in which I integrate
information from Electoral Agency resolutions and from Colombian Official Journals (Diario
Oficiales). As previously mentioned, by law the municipal council size is determined us-
ing population thresholds. Population data for this purpose is based on estimates from the
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). The DANE produces these esti-
16The GMH includes an additional criterion to describe how selective a killing was. A killing with three
or fewer victims is labeled as a “selective killing,” and an event with four or more victims is a “massacre”
(this definition of a massacre is also used by the Colombian National Police Department). Since selective
killings and massacres share key characteristics (e.g. they are both selective and conflict-related), in some
specifications I combine the two as “conflict-related killings.” In other specifications, I distinguish between
selective killings and massacres.
17For more information about the collection procedure, see Restrepo et al. (2004); see also Dube and Vargas
(2013), who extensively use this dataset. I use public data, which is available for 1988-2009.
18After the publication of GMH’s final report, another entity with the same objective was created
(called the National Centre for Historical Memory, NCHM). The NCHM also produced a series of datasets
on conflict-related violence, but uses slightly different definitions. This data can be found at http:
//centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/observatorio/bases-de-datos/. Since the NCHM’s profile is less
academic (relative to GMH’s), quality concerns are even greater for the NCHM data. Thus, for baseline
results, I focus on the GMH and CERAC data, and use the NCHM data only for robustness checks.
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mates centrally, using census data on birth, mortality and immigration rates, and predicting
the structure of the population of the municipalities between censuses using provincial data.19
The fact that this process is carried out centrally, by public officials in Bogota, minimizes the
potential for strategic manipulation of the data by local governments, particularly in medium
and large municipalities.20 Both the data on population size reported by the DANE and the
number of seats assigned to each municipality are reported in Electoral Agency resolutions.21
My analysis starts in 1994, and covers all local elections until the last and decisive cease-fire
with the FARC in 2014 (i.e. it includes elections in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2011).22
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 summarize the mapping between population and council size;
Columns 3 to 8 show the number of observations within 5%, 10% and 15% of each of the
thresholds.
I merge GMH, CERAC, electoral outcomes and population data to create a dataset that
spans from 1997 to 2011 and includes 2,355 local elections. These elections occurred in 564
municipalities, which corresponds to 51.5% of the total number of Colombian municipalities.23
The sources of other variables used for the evaluation of the sample balance are listed in the
note to Table 2.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
I use a sharp RD design to study the impact of council size on armed conflict and political
representation. This design addresses the potential endogeneity between political institutions,
representation and conflict. An RD design relies on the existence of a dichotomous treatment
variable that is a deterministic function of a single continuous covariate. If subjects pass some
threshold level of the variable, they are assigned to the treatment group; otherwise, they are
assigned to the control group. A law that bases the size of municipal councils on population
19To produce these estimates, the DANE uses a version of the cohort-component method that predicts the
age and sex structure of the population in small areas assuming that the demographic trends in these areas
are consistent with the trends in larger areas (see DANE, 2009).
20Since the population estimates use local data on birth, mortality and immigration rates, I cannot rule
out the possibility that the data is manipulated by local authorities. As I will discuss below, the analysis
focuses on municipalities with at least 15,000 inhabitants, for which a manipulation the population data is
less likely. For these municipalities, a battery of data-driven falsification tests provides empirical evidence
about the validity of the design.
21I use Official Journals 43.176, 44.056, 45.265, 46.639, 48.109 and 48.128, which can be consulted at
http://svrpubindc.imprenta.gov.co/diario/; and Electoral Agency Resolutions 2823 to 2852 of 1997.
22The legislation requiring that municipal council size be determined by population was passed in 1994
(Article 22 of Law 136 of 1994). Since the GMH data stops at 2012, and because the government decided not
to use new population estimates to determine the size of municipal councils for the 2011 and 2015 elections
(see Official Journals 48.109, 48.128 and 49.327), for the baseline results I do not use the data on council size
for the councils elected in 2011 and 2015. However, the main results are robust to the inclusion of this data,
for which I use the NCHM conflict-related data mentioned in footnote 18.
23Between 1997 and 2011, among these municipalities, 4 municipalities were created, 28 ceded territory to
a new municipality, and no municipality disappeared. Since the creation of a municipality is partially decided
by the local authorities, and because when a municipality is created its population and the population of other
municipalities abruptly change, the inclusion of these municipalities in the baseline sample may be a concern.
In Web Appendix C, I show that the main results are robust to excluding municipalities where the population
changed due to the creation of another municipality. I thank a referee for suggesting this robustness check.
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is ideal for an RD design because council sizes increase deterministically and discontinuously
at certain population thresholds. Thus, under certain conditions, municipalities with a pop-
ulation just below a given threshold can serve as a plausible counterfactual for municipalities
with a population just above the threshold.
The baseline analysis estimates a regression model within a narrow window around a
single discontinuity; that is, I pool all the thresholds together by normalizing population size
according to the distance of each municipality’s population from the threshold.24 Specifically,
my running variable is the normalized population N˜mt = (Nmt − NT )/NT , where Nmt is the
population of municipality m in electoral year t and NT is the closest population threshold
T .25
By definition, a municipality is treated (has a bigger council size) if Nmt > 0. The RD
estimand for the effect of a bigger council size is defined as:
τRD = lim
N˜mt↓0
E[Ymt+1|N˜mt > 0]− lim
N˜mt↑0
E[Ymt+1|N˜mt < 0] (1)
where Ymt+1 is the outcome of interest in municipality m in the term immediately following
the election in year t.
To estimate τRD, I use local polynomial regressions. I implement this procedure using the
robust bias-corrected estimator with a data-driven bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico
et al. (2014b). Following Calonico et al. (2014a), I report a conventional estimate of τRD and
conventional standard errors, as well as robust bias-corrected p-values. In all specifications,
I include fixed effects of the thresholds and a full set of fixed effects based on the region and
period. Additionally, I cluster the standard errors at the municipal level to account for any
dependence over time within municipalities.
Identification requires that municipalities be unable to systematically manipulate popu-
lation estimates. As previously mentioned, I focus on municipalities with a population of at
least 15,000, for which a manipulation of the data by local governments is less plausible. For
these municipalities, I check for such manipulation by running kernel local linear regressions
of the density separately on both sides of the relevant thresholds (in the spirit of McCrary
2008 and Cattaneo et al. 2018a,b).26 Figure A2 in Web Appendix A reports the results of
McCrary’s and Cattaneo et al.’s tests for each population threshold. All the panels show no
discontinuities.27 For the pooled sample, both McCrary’s and Cattaneo et al.’s tests confirm
24Intervals around each threshold are symmetric and constructed so that no municipality appears in more
than one interval. As illustrated in Table 1, for municipalities with a population of at least 15,000, there are
four thresholds, corresponding to the following critical population sizes at which discrete changes in council
size occur: 20,000, 50,000, 100,000 and 250,000.
25This pooling-and-normalizing approach is widespread in empirical work employing RD designs (for a list
of over 30 empirical papers where RD designs with multiple cutoffs are present and that use a pooling-and-
normalizing approach, see Cattaneo et al., 2020b, Table SA-1; see also Bertanha, 2020). This normalization
procedure estimates an average of local treatment effects weighted by the relative density of individuals near
each of the cutoffs (Cattaneo et al., 2016, Proposition 3). A limitation of this approach is that the estimated
average is a meaningful summary measure only if we are interested in the average effect near the existing
cutoffs. For extensions of this approach, see Bertanha (2020) and Cattaneo et al. (2020b).
26For the population distribution, see Figure A1 in Web Appendix A.
27The estimates of the difference in the height at the threshold (McCrary’s test) and robust manipulation
p-value (Cattaneo et al.’s test) for each population threshold are reported in the note to Figure A2. Figure
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that there is no discontinuity in the density at the normalized threshold (see Figure 1).28
Identification also requires that all relevant factors other than the treatment vary smoothly
at the population thresholds. The idea of this falsification test is that if municipalities lack the
ability to precisely manipulate their population size, there should be no systematic differences
between municipalities with similar population size. Thus, this test complements the density
test described in the last paragraph, and insofar as it implies that near the cutoffs, treated
units are similar to control units in terms of observable (pre-treatment) characteristics, it
is crucial for the validity of the design (on the relevance of this test, see Cattaneo et al.,
2020a). To implement this formal falsification test, Table 2 examines whether more than
50 pre-treatment characteristics are balanced across the normalized population threshold.
Column (7) reports the RD estimand (τRD) from Eq. (1) with bandwidths chosen using
Calonico et al. (2014b)’s procedure when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent
variable. Column (8) reports the corresponding RD standard errors. There are no cases where
the coefficients are statistically different from zero. This evidence strongly suggests that
municipalities with populations just below a given population threshold are a valid control
group for municipalities with populations just above that threshold.29
Finally, identification requires that no other relevant policies are based on a population
discontinuity at the same thresholds. I argued in Section 2 that there are no such policies. I
now provide evidence that, to my knowledge, the only potential case for which there could be
some doubt does not apply. As previously mentioned, this examination is important because
the population affects the salary of the mayor, council members, and administrative staff,
among other things. First, note that Table 2 includes this variable as one of the pre-treatment
characteristics; specifically, it includes the municipal category applied to the first year of a
council’s term, and determined the previous year. Table A5 in Web Appendix A extends this
analysis to include the effect of a larger council size on the municipal category applied prior
to the beginning of the council’s term. Column (1) repeats the results from columns (7) and
(8) in Table 2, showing no statistically significant effect. Columns (2) and (3) in Table A5
focus on the category implemented one (column (2)) and two years (column (3)) prior to the
first year of the council’s term. None of the estimates are significant. These results provide
strong evidence that municipal category does not determine population thresholds.30
A3 in Web Appendix A repeats this analysis for each election year. No estimate is statistically significant.
In addition, no municipality has a population identical to a threshold value, which minimizes the concern of
a bias toward finding a jump in population, as noted by Eggers et al. (2018).
28In Figure A4 in Web Appendix A, I check for systematic manipulation of population estimates in mu-
nicipalities with a population of less than 15,000. The figure shows small jumps around the two smallest
thresholds (5,000 and 10,000). Even though the jumps are small and weakly statistically significant, the
use of data from these municipalities could reduce the trustworthiness of the estimations, in particular if, as
discussed in footnote 20, the small jumps around the two smallest thresholds are related to the fact that the
population estimates are based on data reported by local authorities. This is why, in a trade-off between
thoroughness and transparency, I restrict the analysis to municipalities with a population of at least 15,000
inhabitants. However, all the results are robust to including smaller municipalities.
29Tables A1 and A2 in Web Appendix A repeat the analysis in Table 2, but distinguish between two groups
of thresholds. Table A1 shows a statistically significant effect for some key pre-treatment variables. Tables A3
and A4 show that the effect is specific to municipalities for which the closest population threshold is 20,000.
In Web Appendix B, I show that all the main results are robust to excluding these municipalities.
30Figure A5 in Web Appendix A maps municipal category against population estimates. Panel A displays
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4 Main Results
Panels (a)-(f) in Figure 2 examine how the size of a municipal council affects political
violence. Panels (a)-(b) show the probability that at least one conflict-related killing (either
a selective killing or a massacre) occurs during the term that the council elected in t is in
office, plotted against the normalized population. Panel (b) shows that a larger municipal
council significantly decreases the average probability of a selective killing event. Panel (a)
indicates that this probability is similar during the preceding term of a municipal council,
regardless of whether the size of the succeeding council increases or not.
Panels (c)-(f) in Figure 2 repeat the previous graphical analysis, distinguishing between
selective killings and massacres, which differ in the number of people killed per event. These
results show that the presence of a larger municipal council has a significant effect on selective
killings but almost no effect on massacres.
Columns (1) to (3) of Panel A in Table 3 report the estimates resulting from Eq. (1)
for the outcomes analyzed in Figure 2, but including fixed effects for population threshold,
electoral term and region. The estimates confirm that in municipalities with larger councils,
the probability of a conflict-related killing is significantly lower. Estimates in column (1) show
that the probability of a conflict-related killing during a given period is 4.6 percentage points
lower in municipalities with more councillors. This is a large effect, given that in the sample
a conflict-related selective killing occurs in approximately 14% of the periods. In addition,
columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 confirm that the effect of a larger council is concentrated on
killings that are very selective. Columns (1) to (3) in Panels B and C in Table 3 consider
the effect of a larger council size on the number of conflict-related killings, as a total and per
100,000 residents, respectively. The results are consistent with those in Panel A: the size of
the municipal council affects conflict-related killings, but the effect is concentrated on very
selective killings. Column (4) in Table 3 confirms that a larger council has no impact on
overall homicides, which includes non-conflict-related killings.31
5 Mechanisms
The results presented in the previous section can be explained in several ways. In this
section, I focus on the explanation I believe to be the most plausible: larger municipal councils
decrease conflict-related violence because they lead to more representation for parties with
a scatter plot of the municipal category in the first year of a council’s term; the vertical lines represent the
population thresholds. Panel B depicts the same relationship, but with a scatter plot produced by averaging
the municipal category over cells of 500 inhabitants. Additionally, a solid line plot predicts values from local
regressions. No jump is visible. Figure A6 in Web Appendix A shows a similar result when current spending
is used instead of categorization (also included in Table 2), an additional proxy for the salaries of municipal
councillors and administrative staff.
31In Web Appendix B, I show that the results in Table 3 are robust to i) using as a dependent variable
the ratio of conflict-related killings to total killings, ii) controlling for previous crime rates, iii) using yearly
averages instead of averages over the electoral period, iv) excluding the thresholds 20,000 and 100,000, v)
including the 2011 and 2015 elections (for which I use the NCHM data described in the footnote 18). In
Web Appendix B, I also show that the effect of larger councils is specific to killings that deliberately target
civilians (for which I use as a dependent variable other types of conflict-related violence).
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paramilitary links. This increases the coercive power of paramilitaries and deters guerrillas
from carrying out selective killings.
This “deterrence” hypothesis is based on two main assumptions. First, in municipalities
with larger councils, there is a higher probability that more groups will be directly represented
(I have called this “political openness”); in Colombia, this phenomenon particularly benefited
parties linked to paramilitary groups. Second, when politicians with paramilitary links enjoy
greater influence, the coercive power of paramilitaries is higher, and this translates into a
reduction in selective violence by guerrillas. In the rest of this section, I provide evidence to
support these assumptions.
5.1 Political openness
Panels (a)-(d) in Figure 3 examine how the size of a municipal council affects the number
of parties participating in local elections, and the number of political parties winning at least
one seat. The solid line plots predicted values based on a local polynomial RD model with a
kernel-weighted polynomial fit of order 3 and no covariates. The shaded areas indicate 95%
confidence intervals. While panel (b) shows no effect for the number of parties participating
in an election, panel (d) shows a different pattern: being in the treatment group (i.e. having a
larger municipal council) results in approximately one more party on the council. Panels (a)
and (c) show no effect for the outcomes of the preceding election, which provides additional
evidence that the RD sample is balanced.
Table 4 examines the previous results in more detail using my preferred non-parametric
approach. All columns report estimates over bandwidths chosen using the procedure from
Calonico et al. (2014b). Columns (2)-(3) confirm the results in Figure 3, and column (1)
includes estimates for voter turnout. While showing no effect for turnout or participation
of political parties, these estimates confirm that the number of parties on the council is
significantly higher in municipalities with larger councils, increasing by 1.086 (s.e. = 0.448).
The effect is large, given that the average number of political parties per council in the sample
is approximately 5, and that the increase is one-half of a standard deviation.
The results in Figure 3 and Table 4 provide important evidence that a close relationship
exists between council size and political openness.32 Although my motivation for examining
this relationship is its potential impact on armed conflict, these findings are interesting in
and of themselves. The results are related to a question widely discussed in the political
science literature about the effect of electoral rules on electoral outcomes. According to this
literature, electoral district magnitude — the number of seats elected in a given district in a
given election — should increase the number of parties with representation (see Rae, 1967;
32An additional result is obtained if a peculiarity of the Colombian party system is taken into account:
two political parties, the Liberal Party (center-left) and the Conservative Party (center-right), dominated the
political landscape for over a century. Although this situation has changed in the last decade, Liberals and
Conservatives continue to win a high percentage of elections at all levels of government (in my sample, Liberals
and Conservatives are represented on 81% and 69% of councils, respectively). Column (4) in Table 4 repeats
the analysis in column (3) for parties other than Liberals and Conservatives, which I call “non-traditional”
parties. The estimate shows that the number of non-traditional parties with at least one seat is significantly
larger in municipalities with a larger council. These results provide additional and strong evidence that in
municipalities with larger councils, more political parties have direct representation.
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Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994). The results in Figure 3 and Table 4 are
consistent with this prediction. The explanation is purely mechanical: given a fixed number
of parties running, in municipalities with a larger council more political parties should have
direct representation.33
The previous results provide strong evidence that in municipalities with larger councils,
more political parties have direct representation. Given the background described in Section
2, a natural question that arises is whether the groups that gain representation as a result of
a larger council are linked to armed actors.
To examine this issue, I first classify Colombian political parties based on the histori-
cal characteristics of the party system and also according to their connections to the armed
conflict. A first category includes parties with paramilitary links. To identify such par-
ties, I exploit the “parapolitics” scandal described in Section 2, which revealed that certain
non-traditional parties with representation across the country maintained closed links with
paramilitary groups. Specifically, I focus on parties that are large enough to be represented
in the Colombian Senate, and whose senators have been arrested (and in some cases found
guilty) for having established a series of accords — which at the time were secret — with
paramilitary groups.34
A second category includes left-wing parties. As mentioned in Section 2, only a few such
parties have been explicitly linked to guerrilla groups. However, it is reasonable to expect
that threats and violence targeted elected officials who were more ideologically distant, and
that the guerrillas may have expected less resistance, and perhaps even collaboration or direct
representation, from elected officials who were ideologically close.35
A third category consists of Colombia’s most traditional parties: the Liberal Party and
33By “mechanical”, I mean non-strategic, or to use Duverger’s terminology, “non-psychological” (see Du-
verger, [1951] 1992, p. 315). An alternative — and less mechanical — explanation could be that in electoral
systems with larger districts, voters are more likely to cast a ballot for small parties; this would increase
incentives for small parties to field candidates, which would cause their vote shares to increase, thereby also
increasing the chances that they gain representation (see Duverger, [1951] 1992; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989;
Lijphart, 1994; Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 2006). However, this explanation is inconsistent with
the results in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 the number of parties running and the voter turnout is not
higher in larger districts. In addition, this explanation should only be revelant when voters would like to
support small parties but are wary of “wasting” their votes on candidates who are unlikely to win. As the
previously mentioned literature also emphasizes, if voters prefer large parties to begin with (which may occur
in polities characterized by a lack of politically relevant social heterogeneity), increasing a district’s magnitude
should not affect the number of parties running, nor turnout rates, and a purely mechanical explanation for
an increase the number of parties gaining representation may be more likely.
34Table A7 in the Web Appendix A provides some details about these parties, which have direct represen-
tation on approximately 45% of municipal councils. It is noteworthy that most of these senators were the
leaders of their parties. Among the parties with at least one senator connected to paramilitaries, I select those
whose percentage of senators connected to the paramilitaries is more than 60%; Lopez (2010) describes these
parties as “born captured” by the paramilitaries (see Lopez, 2010, p. 51). Even though 60% is a reasonable
threshold (as shown in Table A7), the main results are robust to using a lower threshold.
35Table A8 in Web Appendix A provides details about these parties, which are represented on 18% of
municipal councils. Even though in some cases the relationship between certain left-wing parties and the
guerrillas may have been ambivalent (Duncan, 2015), during the period I focus on, the biggest guerrilla group
supported Colombia’s most important left-wing party (see Clarin, 2007; Basset, 2008).
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the Conservative Party.36
Table 5 shows the success of paramilitary-linked, left-wing and Liberal or Conservative
parties. It considers the probability of at least one party within each group winning at least
one seat on a municipal council. Interestingly and importantly, while column (1) shows a
statistically significant increase in the probability that a party with paramilitary links wins
at least one seat, column (2) shows that parties that may be ideologically close to guerrilla
groups (those that I classify as “left-wing”) do not increase their representation when the
municipal council is larger. These results provide evidence that paramilitary groups benefited
the most from the greater political openness of larger councils in Colombian municipalities
during the period I focus on.37
The previous results are important for the rest of this paper.38 However, before examining
this relationship, it is convenient to briefly consider the plausibility of an alternative and
intuitive explanation, based on the notion of power-sharing (e.g. as it is presented in Lijphart,
1977; Reynal-Querol, 2002a,b; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Francois et al., 2015). According
to this explanation, greater representation of parties linked to the armed groups could make
these groups see formal political power as a substitute for violence or, alternatively, may
make peaceful interactions between these groups more attractive. Importantly, the results
in Table 5 show that left-wing parties do not gain more political representation on larger
councils, which contradicts the hypothesis that conflict-related killings are lower because left-
wing insurgents are substituting violence for formal political power. As for the paramilitaries,
their close links with local elites and their consequent lack of incentives to use violence to
challenge the status quo mean it is unlikely that they see formal political power as a substitute
for violence. Further, the estimates in Table 5 are also inconsistent with the hypothesis that
larger councils facilitate peaceful interactions between armed groups: column (4) shows that
larger councils do not substantially increase the likelihood that a council will have both a
party with paramilitary links and a left-wing party.39
5.2 Paramilitary-linked representation and political violence
Although the results in the previous subsection are consistent with the deterrence hy-
pothesis, they only provide indirect evidence of a causal relationship between political rep-
resentation with paramilitary links and a lower prevalence of conflict-related violence. In
this subsection, I provide evidence that it is not coincidental that larger municipal coun-
cils are associated both with more parties with paramilitary links and with fewer selective
36See footnote 32 for details about these parties.
37In Web Appendix B, I show that the results in Table 5 are robust to using the alternative definition of
paramilitary-linked and left-wing parties mentioned in the notes to Tables A7 and A8.
38The results in Table 5 can also be understood as providing evidence against a possible concern related
to the interpretation of the results in Section 5.1 as “political openness,” insofar as a political system more
open to groups closely linked to local elites (i.e. the paramilitaries) may also be less open to other groups
traditionally excluded from power (i.e. left-wing parties). In this respect, the estimates in columns (2) and
(4) of Table 5 show that an increase in representation for paramilitary-linked parties is not accompanied by
a simultaneous decrease in representation for left-wing parties.
39Even though column (4) shows a statistically significant increase, the increase is not different from the
effect on the success of paramilitary-linked parties found in column (1).
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killings. In addition, I propose and empirically examine a mechanism through which more
paramilitary-linked representation translates into less political violence.
First, I examine the effect of a larger council on selective killings, distinguishing between
municipalities where paramilitary-linked parties are represented on council (columns (1) to
(3) of panel A in Table 7) and municipalities without paramilitary representation (columns
(4) to (6) of panel A in Table 7). The results confirm that the effect is larger for those
municipalities with paramilitary-linked parties. In municipalities where paramilitaries do not
have political representation, the effect is not statistically different from zero.
The results in panel A of Table 7 are problematic given that the increased representation of
political parties linked to paramilitaries clearly results from council size. As an alternative, I
explore paramilitary political representation in mayoral elections. If the deterrence hypothesis
is true, a mayor from a paramilitary-linked party should reinforce the effect of councillors
with paramilitary links on selective violence. Although the outcomes of mayoral elections
are plausibly related to those for a municipal council, mayors are directly and independently
elected, which alleviates concerns about the election directly depending on the size of the
council. Panel B in Table 7 examines the effect of a larger council on selective killings,
distinguishing between municipalities with and without a mayor from a paramilitary-linked
party (columns (1) to (3) and (4) to (6), respectively). Even though there is a statistically
significant decrease in selective killings in municipalities with a mayor from a party that does
not have paramilitary links, the effect is substantially greater in municipalities with a mayor
from a paramilitary-linked party.40
Now I examine how more paramilitary-linked representation translates into less political
violence. As previously mentioned, my preferred mechanism is based on the idea that when
politicians with paramilitary links enjoy greater influence, the coercive power of paramilitaries
is higher, and in such a scenario, it is likely that guerrillas are deterred from carrying out
selective killings. In the rest this section, I provide more details and empirical evidence in
favor of this specific channel.
An extensive literature has documented the increase in coercive power of Colombian
paramilitaries stemming from the co-opting of politicians and political parties. There is
now a consensus among scholars who study the Colombian conflict that a key objective of
paramilitaries was the capture of institutions and the imposition of a new social order. To
attain this objective, it was crucial to gain the support of local officials through co-optation,
threats or a combination of the two (see Gutierrez and Baron, 2005; Valencia, 2007; Garay
et al., 2008; Avila, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Gafaro et al., 2014; Gutierrez, 2019).41
40In Web Appendix B, I show that a larger council does not affect the probability of electing a mayor from
any group that I have already defined. However, since endogeneity concerns about the mayor’s party may
remain, in Panel C in Table 7, I examine robustness by looking at close mayoral elections. Thus, in addition
to municipalities with populations just above or below the population thresholds, I further restrict the sample
to close mayoral elections where either the first- or second-place candidate is from a party with paramilitary
links (Figure B1 in Web Appendix A reports the RD density tests for manipulation). This panel shows results
that are consistent with those in panels A and B in Table 7 (although the results are imprecise given the
significant loss of observations).
41For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2013) show that when a senator receives a greater proportion of votes in
areas with a significant paramilitary presence, the senator is more likely to subsequently be arrested for illegal
connections with paramilitaries and to have supported legislation viewed as lenient towards such organizations.
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Among the qualitative evidence gathered by the GMH, it is common to find testimonies
showing that in municipalities governed by politicians with paramilitary links, the coercive
power of these armed groups is expressed through the absence of denunciations. The following
is one example:
We did not denounce it [some irregularities associated with the presence in power of politicians linked
to paramilitaries] because, on the one hand, there were pressures; on the other hand, we were afraid to
do it ... We have been asked: “Hey, why did you not denounce it?” But we never seriously considered
that ... Look, in these regions ... you have to be quiet, because if you start talking or something ... you
have to pay (see GMH, 2013a, p. 350)
How does greater paramilitary coercive power cause a reduction in selective violence?
A possible explanation, consistent with the anecdotal evidence documented above, is the
following. In order for an armed group to be able to carry out selective killings, collaboration
from the population is required (for example, by providing information about key targets).
In areas controlled by paramilitary groups, collaboration with the guerrillas is riskier. In
such a scenario, it is reasonable to expect i) less selective killings by the guerrillas, and ii) no
significant difference in selective killings by the paramilitaries.42
An ideal empirical evaluation of this mechanism requires a direct measure of paramilitary
coercive power. Unfortunately, such a measure does not exist. Therefore, in addition to
examining whether this mechanism is consistent with the evidence from previous sections, I
conduct several exercises to test certain key implications.
I start by re-examining the results of the impact of municipal council size on armed
conflict. Table 6 looks at this again using an alternative dataset from the CERAC. Like the
GMH data, the CERAC data provides time-varying information about violent crimes against
persons in a municipality. However, it includes other kinds of actions (e.g. infrastructure
attacks) and, importantly, provides precise information about the main armed group behind
each action.43 In addition to confirming the robustness of the main results in Section 4,
Table 6 sheds more light on the deterrence hypothesis. Column (1) shows that that larger
councils significantly decrease violent actions by any non-state armed group. Columns (2)
to (4) distinguish between violent actions by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the Colombian
army. Column (2) shows that municipalities with larger councils have a significantly lower
probability of violent action by a guerrilla group. Column (3) also shows a negative effect for
violent actions caused by paramilitaries, but it is not statistically significant.44
The deterrence mechanism may also help explain a result in Tables 3 and 7 that I have
According to Gafaro et al. (2014), the presence of armed groups in Colombian municipalities is associated
with increased participation in political organizations, and this greater participation is driven by the capture
of these organizations by the non-state armed actors, who then create networks that impose stronger controls
over the population.
42The effect of paramilitaries on selective killings would be ambiguous because on the one hand they could
obtain more collaboration from the population to carry out killings, but on the other hand there would be
fewer targets (if their deterrence strategy is successful). This mechanism is consistent with Kalyvas 2006,
capt. 7.
43For some killings, the GMH identifies a group that may have carried out the killing. Unfortunately, this
data is very fragmentary: the perpetrator is explicitly identified in only 9.8% of killing events.
44In Web Appendix B, I show that the results in Table 6 are robust to using yearly averages instead of
averages over the electoral period.
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not discussed yet: the impact of greater political representation of paramilitary-linked parties
on selective violence is significantly lower for less selective killings (i.e. massacres). How is
this result consistent with the deterrence hypothesis? A possible explanation is that in order
to carry out a highly selective homicide, an armed group requires high cooperation from the
population. The massacres, insofar as they are less selective killings, require less collaboration
from the population to be carried out. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the coercive
power that an armed group may have over a certain population has a lower (or null) effect
on the occurrence of massacres.45, 46
5.3 Rent Extraction and Power Consolidation
The results in the last sections provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the
decrease in conflict-related homicides in municipalities with larger councils is explained by
greater coercive power of paramilitaries, which results in less violence because guerrilla groups
are deterred from certain kinds of killings. I call this the “deterrence” hypothesis, which I
relate to the literature on the consolidation of power and the establishment of a monopoly on
violence (of paramilitaries). In this last section, I provide additional evidence consistent with
this hypothesis, particularly the incentives of paramilitaries to increase their coercive power
and consolidate their power.
First, recall that Table 6 shows that paramilitary groups do not significantly reduce their
level of violence in municipalities where they have more political representation. This is
counter to the alternative hypothesis that paramilitaries replace their own violence with rent
extraction. However, this does not necessarily mean that paramilitaries’ opportunities for
rent extraction are not elevated for other reasons. In fact, greater paramilitary influence
may imply more instruments to impose order and organize violence. Additionally, as some
literature on stationary banditry shows (see Olson, 1993; Bates et al., 2002; Sanchez de la
Sierra, 2015), as paramilitaries’ power consolidates, their time horizon may be longer, which
may give them incentives to invest in rent-seeking activities.
Empirically assessing the extent to which paramilitary-linked parties capture more rents
is a daunting task. I examine the plausibility of this hypothesis indirectly, by looking at
the effect of a larger municipal council on fiscal outcomes, public goods provision and coca
cultivation. Table 8 shows the RD estimates of the effect of a larger municipal council on key
fiscal outcomes: capital expenditures (i.e. investments in urban infrastructure, education,
health and housing), current expenditures (i.e. supplies and government employee salaries),
revenue from local taxes, and capital revenue (i.e. transfers from the central government
and royalties from natural resource extraction). Greater political power for parties with
paramilitary links may imply a higher capacity for extracting rents through friendly means
(e.g. from natural resource royalties, as suggested by Dube and Vargas, 2013). However, the
results in Table 8 show that this does not seem to be the case: the estimated effect for all
45This mechanism is also consistent with Kalyvas 2006, capt. 7.
46In Web Appendix D, I provide additional (indirect) evidence on the deterrence hypothesis. Specifically, I
show that the effect of an exogenous increase in the influence of politicians with paramilitary links on selective
killings is amplified in areas that have been more contested.
18
fiscal outcomes is not statistically significant.47
Tables 8 shows no evidence of rent extraction when there are councillors from paramilitary
groups. An additional explanation is based on the idea that the paramilitaries’ main objective
is not short-term rent extraction at the local level, but political influence at the national
level. According to this explanation, political representation at the local level should help
paramilitaries get direct political representation at the national level, or at least reduce the
representation of their main competitors (e.g. the left).48 Table 9 considers this possibility by
examining the percentage of votes obtained by paramilitary-linked and left-wing parties in the
next election for the Colombian Senate. Consistent with this hypothesis, column (2) in panel
A shows that municipalities with larger councils voted less for left-wing parties. Importantly,
these results suggest that over time, political openness may have the somewhat paradoxical
effect of making democracy less open by allowing paramilitary groups to have more political
representation. As for the effect on the vote for paramilitary-linked parties, the estimate is
positive, but statistically insignificant.
Since it is clear that paramilitary-linked parties obtained representation on the Colombian
Senate, as a final exercise I examine whether there is an effect of a larger council size on the
percentage of votes obtained by these parties in municipalities where they obtained at least
one seat on the local council. In addition, I examine whether the effect is stronger in the
2002 and 2006 Senate elections, which correspond to the period of maximum penetration
of paramilitaries in national politics. Columns (4) and (5) in panel A of Table 9 show
the estimates of paramilitary-linked parties’ vote shares in municipalities with and without
paramilitary representation on the local council. Panel B in Table 9 focuses on the 2002 and
2006 Senate elections. Importantly, the results are consistent with paramilitary-linked parties
getting more votes in the 2002 and 2006 Senate elections in municipalities in which larger
councils allowed them to get direct political representation.
6 Conclusion
This study examines how Colombian political institutions that are exogenously more open
to the entry of political parties into local government (which I call “political openness”) affects
violence and armed conflict. RD estimates show that non-traditional parties are represented
more frequently in municipalities with larger councils, and that this phenomenon particularly
benefits parties linked to paramilitary groups. RD estimates suggest that the probability
of a conflict-related homicide is significantly lower in municipalities with larger councils and
47Although the results in Table 8 do not provide evidence of rent-seeking, it may be that resources are
extracted through providing fewer public goods or from more illegal activities. Tables A9 and A10 in the Web
Appendix complement these results by looking at certain key indicators of local public goods provision and
coca cultivation. The tables show no evidence of less local public goods provision nor more coca cultivation
or aerial spraying in municipalities with larger councils.
48Leaders of paramilitaries have explicitly recognized this objective (see Gutierrez, 2015). As mentioned in
Section 2, paramilitaries had direct political representation on the Colombia Senate from 2002-2010. Schol-
ars have identified the following potential motivations for the paramilitaries to penetrate national political
institutions: i) helping to approve laws giving de facto amnesty to paramilitaries, and ii) helping to block a
series of laws related to redistributing land titles (see Garay et al., 2008; Lopez, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2013;
Gutierrez, 2019).
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with more councillors linked to paramilitary groups. Further analysis suggests that the lower
level of conflict-related violence is associated with a rise in the political power of paramilitary
groups, and a consequent decrease in violent action by guerrillas.
Several opportunities exist for future research. While I have established that more po-
litical openness results in less conflict-related violence, it is not clear how permanent this
effect is. One could also examine whether the decreases in conflict-related violence within
municipalities reflects an overall reduction in violence or merely a shifting of crime across
municipalities. Finally, there is the question of how increased political openness, and the
consequent political participation of extremist and paramilitary-linked groups, affects the
capacity of the Colombian state to monopolize violence.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Local councils in Colombia from 1997-2007
Obs. in bins of (relative to upper cut-off)
Council 0.05 0.10 0.15
Municipal population members Below Above Below Above Below Above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0-5000 7 62 91 125 152 178 211
5001-10000 9 104 126 231 243 350 351
10001-20000 11 84 91 197 174 322 268
20001-50000 13 40 34 79 64 121 89
50001-100000 15 20 15 35 26 50 40
100001-250000 17 2 7 9 12 14 18
250001-1000000 19 1 0 2 0 4 2
More than 1 million 21 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 summarize the mapping of municipal populations to council sizes as prescribed by
Law 136 of 1994: if a municipality’s population is less than or equal to 5,000, the council must consist of seven
members; if the population is greater than 5,000 but less than or equal to 10,000, the council size must be nine
members, and so on. Columns 3-8 show the number of observations for different bandwidths (the widths of
the “window” of observations around the respective population thresholds). As is discussed in Section 3, the
analysis focuses on municipalities with a population of at least 15,000 inhabitants.
Figure 1: Manipulation tests: pooled thresholds
This figure shows a finely-gridded histogram of the population smoothed using
local linear regressions, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density
function of the population. The figure pools all years, uses data only around
the normalized population threshold, and includes municipalities with a pop-
ulation of at least 15,000 inhabitants. The estimate of the difference in the
height at the threshold and robust manipulation p-value (as implemented in
Stata by the command rddensity.ado, (see Cattaneo et al., 2018a) is 0.025
(s.e. 0.142) and p-value 0.577.
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Table 2: Pre-treatment characteristics
Entire sample 10% population spread
RD SE on
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev. estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)
Killings (overall) 2355 2.619 6.646 598 2.229 5.869 -0.653 0.545
Very selective killings 2355 1.746 4.237 598 1.455 3.665 -0.499 0.382
Massacres 2355 0.873 3.063 598 0.774 2.654 -0.246 0.287
Occurrence of a killing (overall) 2355 0.076 0.120 598 0.065 0.109 -0.018 0.016
Occurrence of a very selective killing 2355 0.069 0.112 598 0.059 0.101 -0.018 0.015
Occurrence of a massacre 2355 0.011 0.034 598 0.011 0.032 -0.002 0.003
Armed conflict (pre-election term)
Action by guerrilla 1900 0.480 0.403 468 0.469 0.402 -0.075 0.073
Action by paramilitaries 1900 0.206 0.292 468 0.201 0.277 -0.046 0.063
Action by Nal. army 1900 0.436 0.385 468 0.442 0.387 -0.123 0.071
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla 1900 0.138 0.256 468 0.122 0.240 -0.017 0.058
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla 1900 0.363 0.381 468 0.356 0.379 -0.086 0.067
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries 1900 0.116 0.233 468 0.110 0.218 -0.011 0.041
Event of massive expulsion 2355 0.085 0.199 598 0.088 0.210 -0.057 0.038
Crime (pre-election term)
Overall homicide rate 2315 58.840 56.840 583 58.897 59.844 -1.246 8.074
Log of hectares of coca 1931 1.147 2.294 498 1.244 2.399 -0.554 0.456
Log of hectares of aerial spraying on coca 1931 0.745 2.050 498 0.858 2.164 -0.663 0.448
Elections (previous election)
Turnout rate 1423 0.572 0.105 376 0.578 0.103 -0.013 0.020
Number of parties in council 1905 5.221 2.110 489 5.327 2.113 0.643 0.332
Council fractionalization 2349 0.975 0.100 596 0.985 0.078 -0.017 0.013
Liberal party in council 1905 0.898 0.303 489 0.857 0.351 0.094 0.050
Conservative party in council 1905 0.708 0.455 489 0.681 0.467 0.175 0.078
Left-wing party in council 1905 0.256 0.437 489 0.254 0.436 0.017 0.068
Party with paramilitary links in council 1905 0.510 0.500 489 0.560 0.497 0.057 0.078
Mayor from Liberal party 2349 0.359 0.480 596 0.344 0.475 -0.041 0.074
Mayor from Conservative party 2349 0.174 0.379 596 0.181 0.386 0.081 0.056
Mayor from left-wing party 2349 0.027 0.162 596 0.020 0.141 0.022 0.032
Mayor from party with paramilitary links 2349 0.076 0.265 596 0.096 0.294 0.063 0.048
Economy and institutions
Municipal category (first year of term) 1424 5.396 1.347 377 5.414 1.271 0.158 0.186
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005) 2355 48.479 22.310 598 48.100 22.708 -4.549 2.964
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997) 2213 34.779 19.559 554 37.190 20.639 -3.234 4.450
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997) 2213 2.842 2.561 554 2.941 2.716 -0.464 0.387
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997 2028 7.364 3.928 502 7.458 3.756 0.479 0.690
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997) 2213 10.030 7.906 555 10.212 8.190 1.289 1.384
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997) 2208 4.306 2.123 552 4.432 2.139 -0.213 0.274
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)
Log current spending per capita 2331 -2.526 0.537 593 -2.519 0.557 0.043 0.094
Log fixed capital spending per capita 2331 -2.222 0.630 593 -2.167 0.674 0.059 0.117
Log other capital spending per capita 2326 -2.014 0.932 593 -1.962 0.903 0.022 0.165
Log tax revenue per capita 2330 -3.291 1.153 592 -3.268 1.156 0.071 0.170
Log royalties per capita 1661 -5.075 2.591 419 -5.031 2.665 0.113 0.596
Log transfers per capita 2308 -1.728 0.546 590 -1.708 0.542 0.119 0.084
Total deficit per capita 2334 -0.018 0.234 593 -0.033 0.414 -0.066 0.084
Geographic characteristics
Surface area (km2) 2355 1223.097 3634.450 598 1367.573 4335.841 -919.130 658.769
Mean altitude (m) 2294 991.990 1424.019 576 985.476 918.371 154.226 141.588
Distance to Bogota (km) 2355 353.962 192.983 598 354.501 195.120 1.050 22.075
Distance to the capital of department (km) 2355 77.396 60.821 598 75.774 60.309 -5.536 9.593
% Municipalities on the Atlantic coast 2355 0.248 0.432 598 0.241 0.428 0.026 0.095
% Municipalities in the eastern region 2355 0.186 0.390 598 0.224 0.417 0.071 0.076
% Municipalities in the central region 2355 0.172 0.377 598 0.154 0.361 0.000 0.060
% Municipalities on the Pacific coast 2355 0.199 0.399 598 0.197 0.398 -0.083 0.067
% Municipalities in Antioquia 2355 0.144 0.352 598 0.129 0.335 -0.026 0.068
% Municipalities in the Amazon region 2355 0.050 0.218 598 0.055 0.229 0.029 0.037
Notes: The sample in all columns includes municipalities with a population of at least 15,000 inhabitants (i.e. it excludes municipalities
with a population where the closest threshold is one of the two smallest thresholds). Pre-election term means that the variable is averaged
for the previous election term. Data on conflict-related killings are from the Historical Memory Group (GMH). Data on armed conflict are
from the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC); this data is available for 1988-2009. Data on crime and geographic characteristics
are from the Center of Studies on Economic Development (CEDE). Electoral data are from the Electoral Agency. Data on municipal public
finance and municipal categories are from the National Planning Department (DNP). Data on population and the proportion of people
with unsatisfied basic needs are from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Data on the number of courts, bank
branches, hospitals, schools and community organizations are from the Social Foundation, a non-profit foundation. Column (7) reports the
RD estimate from equation (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, with a data-driven bandwidth chosen
optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects
for population threshold, electoral term and region. Column (7) reports the standard errors clustered by municipality.
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Figure 2: RD figures for conflict-related violence
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These figures show conflict-related killings by normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller
councils. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in
Stata by the command rdplot.ado. No controls or fixed effects are included. The shaded regions represent the 95%
confidence interval.
23
Table 3: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence
Dependent variable: Conflict-related homicide Overall
Killing Select. killing Massacre homicide
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: prob.
RD Estimate -0.045∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.006 0.013
(0.016) (0.016) (0.004) (0.022)
Observations 2355 2355 2355 2325
Eff. Number of obs 704 627 573 437
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.118 0.106 0.096 0.075
Robust p-value 0.011 0.017 0.190 0.400
Panel B: number
RD Estimate -1.099 -0.921∗ -0.126 -3.580
(0.712) (0.471) (0.291) (4.078)
Observations 2355 2355 2355 2325
Eff. Number of obs 544 548 657 569
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.093 0.093 0.111 0.097
Robust p-value 0.134 0.071 0.637 0.471
Panel C: rate
RD Estimate -2.829 -2.955∗ -0.010 -4.488
(2.408) (1.744) (0.982) (9.656)
Observations 2355 2355 2355 2318
Eff. Number of obs 558 583 598 589
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.095 0.097 0.100 0.101
Robust p-value 0.292 0.097 0.936 0.696
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the
respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The dependent variable in panel A is
the average over the electoral term of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the particular type of killing
is observed in a municipality in a quarter of a year. The dependent variable in panels B and C
is the average of the total number of killings and killings per 100,000 people, respectively. The
bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented
in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold,
electoral term and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 3: RD figures for baseline electoral outcomes
6
8
10
12
14
16
Nu
mb
er 
of p
art
ies
 in 
rac
e (
t-1
)
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Normalized population
(a) Previous election
5
10
15
20
Nu
mb
er 
of p
art
ies
 in 
rac
e (
t)
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Normalized population
(b) Current election
2
4
6
8
10
Nu
mb
er 
of p
art
ies
 in 
cou
nci
l (t-
1)
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Normalized population
(c) Previous election
2
4
6
8
10
Nu
mb
er 
of p
art
ies
 in 
cou
nci
l (t)
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Normalized population
(d) Current election
These figures show electoral outcomes by normalized population size, with a negative value indicating smaller
councils. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in
Stata by the command rdplot.ado. No controls or fixed effects are included. The shaded regions represent the 95%
confidence interval.
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Table 4: Effect of council size on baseline electoral outcomes in council elections
Dependent variable:
Voter # of parties # of parties # of non-traditional
turnout in race on council parties on council
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RD Estimate 0.028 0.314 1.108∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗
(0.029) (0.710) (0.406) (0.413)
Observations 1474 2355 2355 2355
Eff. Number of obs 367 494 514 479
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.099 0.082 0.086 0.080
Robust p-value 0.353 0.717 0.018 0.036
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is
used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as
implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and
region. Information on turnout for the 1997 election is unavailable. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 5: Effect of council size on the success of different parties in council elections
Dependent variable: Presence on council of a
Paramilitary- Left-wing Liberal or Con- Paramilitary-linked
linked party party servative party and left-wing party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RD Estimate 0.298∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.064 0.196∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.072) (0.045) (0.066)
Observations 2355 2355 2355 2355
Eff. Number of obs 573 639 405 426
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.096 0.107 0.069 0.073
Robust p-value 0.000 0.898 0.112 0.003
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is
used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as
implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and
region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Effect of council size on armed conflict
Dependent variable: Presence of violent actions by
Any group Guerrillas Paramilitaries
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate -0.168∗∗ -0.187∗∗ -0.028
(0.074) (0.079) (0.052)
Observations 1900 1900 1900
Eff. Number of obs 378 395 545
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.080 0.083 0.117
Robust p-value 0.021 0.015 0.567
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective character-
istic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold,
electoral term and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence in municipalities with paramilitary-
linked parties represented on the local government
Presence in local government No paramilitary-linked
of a paramilitary-linked party party in local government
Dep. var. is occurrence of a Killing Select. killing Massacre Killing Select. killing Massacre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Municipal council
RD Estimate -0.068∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.004 -0.022 -0.011 -0.003
(0.032) (0.031) (0.003) (0.027) (0.025) (0.009)
Observations 1191 1191 1191 1164 1164 1164
Eff. Number of obs 264 260 275 307 287 279
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.083 0.082 0.088 0.109 0.101 0.098
Robust p-value 0.037 0.041 0.231 0.580 0.802 0.730
Panel B: Mayoralty (entire sample)
RD Estimate -0.061 -0.093 -0.007 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.098) (0.089) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004)
Observations 212 212 212 2143 2143 2143
Eff. Number of obs 39 44 22 688 648 579
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.069 0.076 0.052 0.126 0.119 0.108
Robust p-value 0.360 0.223 0.157 0.014 0.020 0.269
Panel C: Mayoralty (close victory)
RD Estimate -0.151∗ -0.144∗ -0.007∗ -0.024 -0.021 -0.003
(0.087) (0.086) (0.004) (0.027) (0.028) (0.003)
Observations 77 77 77 96 96 96
Eff. Number of obs 25 24 20 30 29 28
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.095 0.093 0.065 0.118 0.117 0.110
Robust p-value 0.108 0.104 0.031 0.556 0.649 0.190
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the
dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by
the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and region. Standard errors clustered by
municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 8: Effect of council size on fiscal outcomes
Dependent variable: Log of
Capital Current Tax Central govt. resource Total
spending spending revenue transfers royalties deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RD Estimate 0.023 -0.041 0.085 0.082 0.134 -0.010
(0.105) (0.085) (0.162) (0.079) (0.557) (0.016)
Observations 2343 2341 2341 2341 1769 2344
Eff. Number of obs 575 517 501 674 396 378
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.097 0.088 0.084 0.114 0.091 0.064
Robust p-value 0.971 0.593 0.762 0.358 0.923 0.364
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective character-
istic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold,
electoral term and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 9: Effect of council size on the next Senate election
Dependent variable: Success in the next Senate election of
Paramilitary-linked parties
Paramilitary- Left-wing Liberals or Also present Not present
linked parties parties Conservatives in council in council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A % of votes in next Senate elections (all elections)
RD Estimate 0.112 -2.559∗ 0.981 1.238 -2.149
(2.033) (1.321) (3.011) (2.314) (3.018)
Observations 2349 2349 2349 1189 1160
Eff. Number of obs 651 595 688 300 277
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.110 0.100 0.116 0.095 0.098
Robust p-value 0.901 0.038 0.532 0.439 0.491
Panel B % of votes in next Senate elections (only 2002 and 2006 elections)
RD Estimate 4.646 -2.731 0.565 6.990∗ -1.063
(3.835) (1.911) (3.755) (4.031) (5.210)
Observations 1016 1016 1016 498 518
Eff. Number of obs 271 235 253 111 137
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.118 0.100 0.109 0.103 0.111
Robust p-value 0.251 0.120 0.777 0.090 0.853
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as
the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in
Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and region. Standard errors
clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Appendix A : Supplemental Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Population distribution
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Figure A2: Manipulation tests by population threshold
(a) 20,000 threshold (b) 50,000 threshold
(c) 100,000 threshold (d) 250,000 threshold
All figures pool all years, and show finely-gridded histograms of the population smoothed using local linear
regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the population. Each figure uses
data only around the corresponding population threshold. The estimates of the difference in the height at
the threshold and robust manipulation p-values (as implemented in Stata by the command rddensity.ado, (see
Cattaneo et al., 2018a), are: (a) 0.092 (s.e. 0.177) and p-value 0.2549; (b) -0.055 (s.e. 0.304) and p-value 0.5612;
(c) -0.316 (s.e. 0.441) and p-value 0.6704; (d) -0.207 (s.e. 0.669) and p-value 0.2358.
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Figure A3: Manipulation tests by election year
(a) 1997 (b) 2000
(c) 2003 (d) 2007
All figures show finely-gridded histograms of the population smoothed using local linear regression, separately
on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the population (McCrary, 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2018a).
Each figure uses data only around the corresponding population threshold, and includes municipalities with a
population of at least 15,000 inhabitants. The estimates of the difference in the height at the threshold and
robust manipulation p-values (as implemented in Stata by the command rddensity.ado, (see Cattaneo et al.,
2018a), are: (a) -0.299 (s.e. 0.273) and p-value 0.266, (b) 0.112 (s.e. 0.263) and p-value 0.732, (c) -0.073 (s.e.
0.284) and p-value 0.391, (d) 0.133 (s.e. 0.220) and p-value 0.271.
39
Figure A4: Manipulation tests by population threshold: two smallest thresholds
(a) 5,000 threshold (b) 10,000 threshold
All figures pool all years, and show finely-gridded histograms of the population smoothed using local linear
regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the population. Each figure uses
data only around the corresponding population threshold. The estimates of the difference in the height at
the threshold and robust manipulation p-values (as implemented in Stata by the command rddensity.ado, (see
Cattaneo et al., 2018a), are: (a) 0.326 (s.e. 0.190) and p-value 0.0685; (b) 0.350 (s.e. 0.176) and p-value 0.0613.
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Table A1: Pre-treatment characteristics (20,000 and 50,000 thresholds)
Entire sample 10% population spread
RD SE on
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev. estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)
Killings (overall) 1635 2.288 4.868 405 2.024 4.010 -1.119 0.658
Very selective killings 1635 1.437 2.713 405 1.315 2.620 -0.984 0.411
Massacres 1635 0.851 2.721 405 0.709 1.977 -0.152 0.354
Occurrence of a killing (overall) 1635 0.069 0.098 405 0.062 0.096 -0.032 0.017
Occurrence of a very selective killing 1635 0.061 0.089 405 0.056 0.088 -0.032 0.016
Occurrence of a massacre 1635 0.011 0.029 405 0.010 0.025 -0.002 0.005
Armed conflict (pre-election term)
Action by guerrilla 1635 0.466 0.403 405 0.454 0.399 -0.126 0.085
Action by paramilitaries 1635 0.183 0.271 405 0.177 0.257 -0.060 0.052
Action by Nal. army 1635 0.414 0.379 405 0.414 0.379 -0.163 0.077
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla 1635 0.121 0.236 405 0.103 0.219 -0.036 0.049
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla 1635 0.348 0.375 405 0.338 0.369 -0.159 0.073
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries 1635 0.091 0.196 405 0.086 0.187 -0.039 0.034
Event of massive expulsion 1635 0.097 0.212 405 0.102 0.225 -0.044 0.050
Crime (pre-election term)
Overall homicide rate 1598 65.045 62.271 391 66.895 64.949 -4.990 10.596
Log of hectares of coca 1269 1.172 2.328 313 1.360 2.506 -0.612 0.613
Log of hectares of aerial spraying on coca 1269 0.804 2.157 313 0.960 2.323 -0.823 0.627
Elections (previous election)
Turnout rate 830 0.566 0.115 207 0.571 0.114 -0.044 0.024
Number of parties in council 1244 4.796 1.992 304 4.740 1.977 0.193 0.435
Council fractionalization 1629 0.967 0.116 403 0.980 0.088 -0.026 0.023
Liberal party in council 1244 0.901 0.299 304 0.862 0.346 0.117 0.078
Conservative party in council 1244 0.699 0.459 304 0.678 0.468 0.054 0.122
Left-wing party in council 1244 0.225 0.418 304 0.217 0.413 -0.129 0.087
Party with paramilitary links in council 1244 0.397 0.489 304 0.444 0.498 0.027 0.121
Mayor from Liberal party 1629 0.397 0.489 403 0.390 0.488 -0.058 0.112
Mayor from Conservative party 1629 0.191 0.393 403 0.218 0.414 0.124 0.086
Mayor from left-wing party 1629 0.022 0.147 403 0.010 0.099 0.012 0.029
Mayor from party with paramilitary links 1629 0.056 0.230 403 0.067 0.250 0.075 0.058
Economy and institutions
Municipal category (first year of term) 835 5.819 0.625 208 5.889 0.503 0.135 0.141
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005) 1635 52.506 21.142 405 52.540 21.515 -4.719 4.109
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1585 34.058 19.287 387 35.620 20.070 -4.586 5.893
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1585 3.027 2.706 387 3.145 2.922 -0.189 0.508
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997 1379 7.510 3.964 331 7.654 3.720 0.176 0.738
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1585 10.095 8.223 388 10.065 8.143 1.581 1.416
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1581 4.560 2.072 385 4.744 2.083 -0.491 0.300
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)
Log current spending per capita 1613 -2.508 0.535 401 -2.515 0.588 0.085 0.118
Log fixed capital spending per capita 1612 -2.255 0.568 401 -2.220 0.594 -0.027 0.106
Log other capital spending per capita 1607 -2.206 0.898 401 -2.188 0.878 -0.172 0.185
Log tax revenue per capita 1612 -3.572 1.134 400 -3.598 1.113 0.098 0.189
Log royalties per capita 1064 -5.086 2.614 257 -5.153 2.797 -0.078 0.739
Log transfers per capita 1591 -1.803 0.499 398 -1.785 0.478 0.053 0.094
Total deficit per capita 1615 -0.015 0.278 401 -0.035 0.502 -0.105 0.117
Geographic characteristics
Surface area (km2) 1635 1212.579 3717.283 405 1451.821 4693.372 -818.574 829.630
Mean altitude (m) 1596 1028.048 1487.873 390 998.369 918.108 97.744 162.835
Distance to Bogota (km) 1635 350.255 189.249 405 353.554 189.256 -2.283 23.116
Distance to the capital of department (km) 1635 81.685 58.385 405 79.743 57.638 -1.267 11.366
% Municipalities on the Atlantic coast 1635 0.239 0.426 405 0.235 0.424 0.015 0.103
% Municipalities in the eastern region 1635 0.179 0.383 405 0.200 0.400 0.066 0.095
% Municipalities in the central region 1635 0.175 0.380 405 0.173 0.379 0.006 0.079
% Municipalities on the Pacific coast 1635 0.202 0.402 405 0.207 0.406 -0.064 0.097
% Municipalities in Antioquia 1635 0.150 0.358 405 0.126 0.332 -0.043 0.078
% Municipalities in the Amazon region 1635 0.055 0.228 405 0.059 0.236 0.008 0.048
Notes: The sample in all columns include municipalities with a population up to 75,000 (i.e. it includes municipalities for which the
closest population thresholds are 20,000 and 50,000). Pre-election term means that the variable is averaged for the previous election term.
The sources of the variables are listed in the note to Table 2. Column (7) reports the RD estimate from equation (1) when the respective
characteristic is used as the dependent variable, with a data-driven bandwidth chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and
region. Column (7) reports the standard errors clustered by municipality.
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Table A2: Pre-treatment characteristics (100,000, 250,000 and 1,000,000 thresholds)
Entire sample 10% population spread
RD SE on
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev. estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)
Killings (overall) 265 7.382 14.055 63 6.700 14.036 2.707 3.315
Very selective killings 265 5.080 9.006 63 4.149 8.457 2.669 2.433
Massacres 265 2.303 5.862 63 2.550 6.155 -0.536 1.412
Occurrence of a killing (overall) 265 0.180 0.207 63 0.151 0.189 0.104 0.077
Occurrence of a very selective killing 265 0.167 0.196 63 0.136 0.177 0.100 0.074
Occurrence of a massacre 265 0.031 0.068 63 0.033 0.073 0.003 0.015
Armed conflict (pre-election term)
Action by guerrilla 265 0.567 0.398 63 0.569 0.411 0.152 0.259
Action by paramilitaries 265 0.352 0.365 63 0.358 0.346 0.091 0.179
Action by Nal. army 265 0.571 0.400 63 0.616 0.396 0.059 0.211
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla 265 0.245 0.338 63 0.243 0.321 0.155 0.144
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla 265 0.452 0.407 63 0.475 0.424 0.215 0.256
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries 265 0.275 0.349 63 0.262 0.322 0.244 0.171
Event of massive expulsion 265 0.119 0.235 63 0.140 0.269 -0.103 0.100
Crime (pre-election term)
Overall homicide rate 263 60.375 48.212 63 57.075 60.700 1.067 15.722
Log of hectares of coca 207 0.678 1.776 55 0.757 1.839 0.568 0.456
Log of hectares of aerial spraying on coca 207 0.254 1.040 55 0.191 0.913 0.126 0.219
Elections (previous election)
Turnout rate 138 0.537 0.077 39 0.553 0.085 0.039 0.036
Number of parties in council 207 6.749 2.442 55 7.000 1.944 0.087 0.576
Council fractionalization 265 0.987 0.069 63 0.986 0.083 -0.009 0.010
Liberal party in council 207 0.990 0.098 55 0.982 0.135 0.020 0.021
Conservative party in council 207 0.778 0.417 55 0.655 0.480 0.455 0.229
Left-wing party in council 207 0.391 0.489 55 0.455 0.503 0.276 0.179
Party with paramilitary links in council 207 0.551 0.499 55 0.545 0.503 0.234 0.277
Mayor from Liberal party 265 0.400 0.491 63 0.397 0.493 -0.091 0.171
Mayor from Conservative party 265 0.087 0.282 63 0.048 0.215 0.019 0.045
Mayor from left-wing party 265 0.064 0.245 63 0.095 0.296 0.166 0.198
Mayor from party with paramilitary links 265 0.072 0.258 63 0.095 0.296 -0.003 0.195
Economy and institutions
Municipal category (first year of term) 137 3.073 1.865 39 3.308 1.575 0.706 0.667
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005) 265 32.266 18.021 63 31.057 17.495 -0.562 6.670
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997) 205 39.799 20.204 50 48.913 20.381 -1.489 8.783
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997) 205 1.710 0.886 50 1.588 0.962 -0.298 0.418
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997 257 6.999 3.956 60 6.416 3.550 1.062 1.963
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997) 205 9.886 5.026 50 10.128 5.337 1.985 2.904
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997) 205 2.673 1.949 50 2.701 2.129 0.198 1.052
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)
Log current spending per capita 263 -2.394 0.555 62 -2.423 0.486 -0.163 0.132
Log fixed capital spending per capita 264 -2.602 0.594 62 -2.657 0.641 0.318 0.258
Log other capital spending per capita 264 -2.270 1.024 62 -2.188 0.863 0.567 0.348
Log tax revenue per capita 263 -2.574 0.837 62 -2.485 0.741 -0.074 0.251
Log royalties per capita 203 -5.847 2.388 45 -5.434 1.962 1.600 0.879
Log transfers per capita 262 -2.061 0.649 62 -2.145 0.693 0.296 0.268
Total deficit per capita 264 -0.008 0.051 62 -0.008 0.040 -0.000 0.020
Geographic characteristics
Surface area (km2) 265 1050.407 1314.433 63 995.829 1476.018 -85.269 397.161
Mean altitude (m) 257 846.459 860.950 60 968.900 945.462 177.597 321.918
Distance to Bogota (km) 265 362.915 214.318 63 367.744 225.071 62.552 59.693
Distance to the capital of department (km) 265 48.935 63.505 63 48.311 57.049 29.449 18.872
% Municipalities on the Atlantic coast 265 0.272 0.446 63 0.222 0.419 -0.135 0.235
% Municipalities in the eastern region 265 0.245 0.431 63 0.381 0.490 0.181 0.257
% Municipalities in the central region 265 0.162 0.369 63 0.032 0.177 0.039 0.061
% Municipalities on the Pacific coast 265 0.192 0.395 63 0.206 0.408 -0.110 0.149
% Municipalities in Antioquia 265 0.109 0.313 63 0.143 0.353 0.013 0.142
% Municipalities in the Amazon region 265 0.019 0.136 63 0.016 0.126 0.031 0.042
Notes: The sample in all columns include municipalities with a population of at least 75,000 (i.e. it includes municipalities for which the
closest population thresholds are 100,000, 250,000 and 1,000,000). Pre-election term means that the variable is averaged for the previous
election term. The sources of the variables are listed in the note to Table 2. Column (7) reports the RD estimate from equation (1)
when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, with a data-driven bandwidth chosen optimally using the algorithm
by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold,
electoral term and region. Column (7) reports the standard errors clustered by municipality.
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Table A3: Pre-treatment characteristics (20,000 threshold)
Entire sample 10% population spread
RD SE on
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev. estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)
Killings (overall) 1217 1.912 4.036 291 1.652 3.302 -1.890 0.664
Very selective killings 1217 1.185 2.233 291 0.994 1.932 -1.650 0.453
Massacres 1217 0.727 2.354 291 0.658 1.991 -0.266 0.430
Occurrence of a killing (overall) 1217 0.059 0.087 291 0.051 0.082 -0.063 0.022
Occurrence of a very selective killing 1217 0.052 0.078 291 0.045 0.074 -0.063 0.020
Occurrence of a massacre 1217 0.009 0.026 291 0.009 0.023 -0.002 0.005
Armed conflict (pre-election term)
Action by guerrilla 1217 0.449 0.399 291 0.432 0.393 -0.100 0.100
Action by paramilitaries 1217 0.164 0.253 291 0.153 0.227 -0.052 0.060
Action by Nal. army 1217 0.393 0.373 291 0.389 0.373 -0.172 0.083
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla 1217 0.105 0.219 291 0.082 0.182 -0.032 0.062
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla 1217 0.329 0.366 291 0.317 0.359 -0.209 0.099
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries 1217 0.078 0.179 291 0.071 0.164 -0.060 0.044
Event of massive expulsion 1217 0.087 0.195 291 0.092 0.202 0.048 0.050
Crime (pre-election term)
Overall homicide rate 1187 64.302 62.060 282 66.732 64.749 -18.812 14.018
Log of hectares of coca 943 1.168 2.295 227 1.417 2.523 0.124 0.715
Log of hectares of aerial spraying on coca 943 0.806 2.130 227 0.986 2.346 -0.259 0.717
Elections (previous election)
Turnout rate 618 0.571 0.119 150 0.572 0.120 -0.038 0.032
Number of parties in council 919 4.603 1.929 219 4.438 1.860 0.187 0.472
Council fractionalization 1212 0.964 0.120 290 0.973 0.102 -0.027 0.032
Liberal party in council 919 0.879 0.326 219 0.831 0.376 0.103 0.145
Conservative party in council 919 0.700 0.459 219 0.658 0.476 -0.037 0.203
Left-wing party in council 919 0.209 0.407 219 0.205 0.405 -0.202 0.120
Party with paramilitary links in council 919 0.370 0.483 219 0.397 0.490 0.123 0.177
Mayor from Liberal party 1212 0.381 0.486 290 0.369 0.483 -0.331 0.150
Mayor from Conservative party 1212 0.193 0.395 290 0.214 0.411 0.161 0.130
Mayor from left-wing party 1212 0.023 0.150 290 0.007 0.083 0.036 0.024
Mayor from party with paramilitary links 1212 0.059 0.236 290 0.066 0.248 0.205 0.088
Economy and institutions
Municipal category (first year of term) 623 5.934 0.346 151 5.960 0.303 0.031 0.173
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005) 1217 54.284 20.616 291 54.958 21.010 -1.382 5.738
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1172 32.994 18.975 275 33.644 18.870 -8.078 7.810
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1172 3.298 3.007 275 3.493 3.334 -1.493 0.873
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997 990 8.106 4.046 223 8.429 3.475 -0.973 1.128
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1172 10.076 8.129 276 10.171 8.054 0.455 1.659
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997) 1168 5.103 1.859 273 5.447 1.590 -0.197 0.383
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)
Log current spending per capita 1198 -2.504 0.524 287 -2.502 0.564 0.055 0.143
Log fixed capital spending per capita 1200 -2.188 0.566 287 -2.121 0.580 -0.048 0.157
Log other capital spending per capita 1196 -2.158 0.907 287 -2.096 0.812 -0.004 0.206
Log tax revenue per capita 1197 -3.669 1.154 286 -3.693 1.123 0.061 0.273
Log royalties per capita 757 -4.922 2.575 174 -4.901 2.621 -1.349 0.966
Log transfers per capita 1178 -1.728 0.474 285 -1.690 0.453 0.098 0.119
Total deficit per capita 1200 -0.010 0.154 287 -0.013 0.149 0.028 0.025
Geographic characteristics
Surface area (km2) 1217 1070.192 3057.046 291 1257.260 3547.250 -1021.584 1198.158
Mean altitude (m) 1189 1006.140 1120.339 281 1018.267 929.035 89.235 232.707
Distance to Bogota (km) 1217 346.772 189.067 291 351.468 191.334 -2.885 34.905
Distance to the capital of department (km) 1217 84.123 60.034 291 83.306 59.920 -4.183 15.684
% Municipalities on the Atlantic coast 1217 0.233 0.423 291 0.216 0.413 0.016 0.107
% Municipalities in the eastern region 1217 0.191 0.393 291 0.213 0.410 0.078 0.143
% Municipalities in the central region 1217 0.182 0.386 291 0.179 0.384 0.056 0.114
% Municipalities on the Pacific coast 1217 0.210 0.408 291 0.223 0.417 -0.191 0.143
% Municipalities in Antioquia 1217 0.137 0.344 291 0.113 0.318 0.037 0.112
% Municipalities in the Amazon region 1217 0.047 0.211 291 0.055 0.228 -0.068 0.072
Notes: The sample in all columns include municipalities with a population between 15,000 and 35,000 (i.e. it includes municipalities for
which the closest population threshold is 20,000). Pre-election term means that the variable is averaged for the previous election term.
The sources of the variables are listed in the note to Table 2. Column (7) reports the RD estimate from equation (1) when the respective
characteristic is used as the dependent variable, with a data-driven bandwidth chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and
region. Column (7) reports the standard errors clustered by municipality.
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Table A4: Pre-treatment characteristics (50,000 threshold)
Entire sample 10% population spread
RD SE on
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev. estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conflict-related violence (pre-election term)
Killings (overall) 418 3.381 6.614 114 2.973 5.314 -1.183 1.159
Very selective killings 418 2.171 3.684 114 2.135 3.744 -0.714 0.798
Massacres 418 1.210 3.562 114 0.838 1.943 -0.426 0.460
Occurrence of a killing (overall) 418 0.096 0.121 114 0.090 0.120 -0.001 0.032
Occurrence of a very selective killing 418 0.087 0.112 114 0.083 0.112 -0.002 0.030
Occurrence of a massacre 418 0.015 0.036 114 0.012 0.029 -0.005 0.008
Armed conflict (pre-election term)
Action by guerrilla 418 0.516 0.409 114 0.510 0.411 -0.237 0.131
Action by paramilitaries 418 0.239 0.310 114 0.238 0.315 -0.143 0.112
Action by Nal. army 418 0.472 0.390 114 0.480 0.390 -0.172 0.111
Encounter paramilitaries vs guerrilla 418 0.166 0.275 114 0.156 0.288 -0.137 0.109
Encounter Nal. army vs guerrilla 418 0.402 0.393 114 0.390 0.389 -0.157 0.114
Encounter Nal. army vs paramilitaries 418 0.126 0.236 114 0.126 0.230 -0.054 0.066
Event of massive expulsion 418 0.126 0.253 114 0.126 0.273 -0.203 0.102
Crime (pre-election term)
Overall homicide rate 411 67.191 62.902 109 67.319 65.761 -6.892 11.532
Log of hectares of coca 326 1.183 2.426 86 1.210 2.469 -1.435 0.860
Log of hectares of aerial spraying on coca 326 0.798 2.236 86 0.891 2.274 -1.048 0.839
Elections (previous election)
Turnout rate 212 0.552 0.101 57 0.568 0.098 -0.040 0.044
Number of parties in council 325 5.342 2.066 85 5.518 2.068 -0.102 0.893
Council fractionalization 417 0.973 0.104 113 0.998 0.026 -0.016 0.015
Liberal party in council 325 0.963 0.189 85 0.941 0.237 -0.005 0.074
Conservative party in council 325 0.698 0.460 85 0.729 0.447 0.087 0.155
Left-wing party in council 325 0.271 0.445 85 0.247 0.434 -0.022 0.151
Party with paramilitary links in council 325 0.474 0.500 85 0.565 0.499 -0.188 0.154
Mayor from Liberal party 417 0.444 0.497 113 0.442 0.499 0.282 0.177
Mayor from Conservative party 417 0.185 0.388 113 0.230 0.423 0.015 0.147
Mayor from left-wing party 417 0.019 0.137 113 0.018 0.132 0.068 0.060
Mayor from party with paramilitary links 417 0.046 0.209 113 0.071 0.258 -0.047 0.102
Economy and institutions
Municipal category (first year of term) 212 5.481 1.019 57 5.702 0.801 0.473 0.230
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993 or 2005) 418 47.327 21.815 114 46.366 21.648 -13.892 6.296
Schools per 1000 inhab. (1997) 413 37.075 19.860 112 40.472 22.099 3.072 7.510
Hospitals per 1000 inhab. (1997) 413 2.256 1.284 112 2.291 1.103 0.887 0.341
Bank branches per 1000 inhab. in 1997 389 5.991 3.298 108 6.055 3.714 1.857 0.950
Courts per 1000 inhab. (1997) 413 10.151 8.493 112 9.804 8.391 2.080 2.599
Police stations per 1000 inhab. (1997) 413 3.025 1.863 112 3.028 2.153 -0.581 0.584
Fiscal outcomes (pre-election term)
Log current spending per capita 415 -2.521 0.568 114 -2.546 0.647 0.259 0.212
Log fixed capital spending per capita 412 -2.452 0.527 114 -2.467 0.559 -0.153 0.213
Log other capital spending per capita 411 -2.345 0.855 114 -2.420 0.990 -0.291 0.255
Log tax revenue per capita 415 -3.291 1.026 114 -3.358 1.054 0.400 0.244
Log royalties per capita 307 -5.490 2.672 83 -5.683 3.083 1.648 1.166
Log transfers per capita 413 -2.017 0.505 113 -2.026 0.456 -0.178 0.128
Total deficit per capita 415 -0.029 0.483 114 -0.091 0.911 -0.343 0.315
Geographic characteristics
Surface area (km2) 418 1627.135 5163.573 114 1948.462 6790.810 -662.536 1458.759
Mean altitude (m) 407 1092.049 2240.245 109 947.073 891.467 48.333 235.540
Distance to Bogota (km) 418 360.394 189.638 114 358.879 184.567 -13.960 41.070
Distance to the capital of department (km) 418 74.589 52.722 114 70.648 50.468 -0.456 17.076
% Municipalities on the Atlantic coast 418 0.254 0.436 114 0.281 0.451 -0.005 0.200
% Municipalities in the eastern region 418 0.144 0.351 114 0.167 0.374 -0.001 0.135
% Municipalities in the central region 418 0.156 0.363 114 0.158 0.366 -0.011 0.147
% Municipalities on the Pacific coast 418 0.179 0.384 114 0.167 0.374 0.011 0.157
% Municipalities in Antioquia 418 0.189 0.392 114 0.158 0.366 -0.149 0.084
% Municipalities in the Amazon region 418 0.079 0.270 114 0.070 0.257 0.129 0.083
Notes: The sample in all columns include municipalities with a population between 35,000 and 75,000 (i.e. it includes municipalities for
which the closest population threshold is 50,000). Pre-election term means that the variable is averaged for the previous election term.
The sources of the variables are listed in the note to Table 2. Column (7) reports the RD estimate from equation (1) when the respective
characteristic is used as the dependent variable, with a data-driven bandwidth chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and
region. Column (7) reports the standard errors clustered by municipality.
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Table A5: Relationship between council size and municipal category
Dependent variable: Municipal category for
last next-to-last
first year year of year of
of term previous term previous term
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate 0.158 0.133 -0.105
(0.186) (0.173) (0.161)
Observations 1424 1427 1427
Eff. Number of obs 444 377 429
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.118 0.100 0.115
Robust p-value 0.418 0.431 0.603
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when
the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen
optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the
command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and
region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Figure A5: Municipal category and population size
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Panel (a) shows the scatterplot of municipal category by population size; panel (b) shows the scatterplot
averaged over 1,000-inhabitant bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval
between two thresholds. The vertical lines identify the population thresholds used in the determination of
the council size. To facilitate the exposition it includes municipalities with a population of 250,000 or less.
Figure A6: Current spending and population size
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Panel (a) shows the scatterplot of current spending by population size; panel (b) shows the scatterplot
averaged over 1,000-inhabitant bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval
between two thresholds. The vertical lines identify the population thresholds used in the determination of
the council size. To facilitate the exposition it includes municipalities with a population of 250,000 or less.
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Table A6: Effect of council size on baseline electoral outcomes: Robustness to exclud-
ing the 20,000 and 100,000 thresholds
Dependent variable:
# of non-tradi-
Voter # of parties # of parties tional parties
turnout in race on council on council
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Excluding 20,000 threshold
RD Estimate 0.035 0.039 2.146∗∗∗ 1.750∗∗
(0.026) (1.218) (0.796) (0.735)
Observations 532 683 683 683
Eff. Number of obs 151 159 110 115
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.111 0.092 0.059 0.063
Robust p-value 0.160 0.907 0.006 0.016
Panel B: Excluding 100,000 threshold
RD Estimate 0.018 0.672 0.861∗ 0.764∗
(0.032) (0.859) (0.463) (0.459)
Observations 1350 1743 1743 1743
Eff. Number of obs 329 379 412 370
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.100 0.089 0.096 0.086
Robust p-value 0.607 0.593 0.098 0.118
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as
the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in
Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and region. Standard errors
clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table A7: Paramilitary-linked parties
Political % of senators
party prosecuted or convicted
1 Colombia Viva1 100%
2 Colombia Democratica2 100%
3 Convergencia Popular Cı´vica 100%
4 Convergencia Ciudadana3 63%
5 Alas-Equipo Colombia4 60%
6 Cambio Radical 47%
7 Partido de la U 37%
8 Conservador 22%
Notes: The data on senators prosecuted or convicted because of close ties to paramilitary groups
are from Lopez and Sevillano (2008), Indepaz (2012) and MOE (2013), which report information
obtained from justice authorities. The baseline definition includes the first five parties listed, where
the majority of the leaders were involved in the parapolitics scandal. An alternative definition also
includes the Cambio Radical.
1 Includes the Integracion Popular, whose leaders it incorporated (Semana, 2007).
2 Includes the Mov. Popular Unido, Mov. Nacional Progresista and Moral from which it originated,
and the Mov. de Inclusion y Oportunidades to which it was renamed (see Lopez and Sevillano, 2008).
3 Includes the Integracion Nacional, to which it was renamed (see ElTiempo, 2009).
4 Includes the parties ALAS and Equipo Colombia, from which it originated (see Lopez and Sevillano,
2008).
Table A8: Left-wing parties
Political Party
1 Union Patriotica 9 Frente Social y Politico
2 Polo Democratico Alternativo 10 Movimiento 19 de abril
3 Polo Democratico Independiente 11 Socialdemocrata Colombiano
4 Partido Comunista 12 Independiente Frente de Esperanza
5 Alianza Nacional Popular ANAPO 13 Movimiento Ciudadano
6 Alianza Democratica M19 14 Alternativa Democratica
7 MOIR 15 Unidad Democratica
8 Frente Social y Politico 16 Vamos Ipiales
Notes: The classification of left-wing parties mainly follows (see Fergusson et al., 2017), and adds the Partido Comunista
and excludes the Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia, which may be described as an ethnic party (see Duque, 2008;
Laurent, 2010). An alternative definition also includes the parties Via Alterna and Socialismo Democratico (see Semana,
2000, 2011). Fergusson et al. (2017) propose a classification of the ideology of 505 different parties that either won or
came second in mayoral elections during the period I focus on. Since Fergusson et al. (2017) focus on parties that are
relevant in mayoral elections (while I focus on council elections), the estimates that use this measure may be less precise
than with perfect data. However, it is reasonable to think that if a local party is relevant in mayoral elections, it is also
relevant in council elections.
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Table A9: Effect of council size on local public goods provision
Dependent variable:
Public school Poor with health Access to clean
enrollment (per capita) insurance (%) water (per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate 0.013 0.024 -0.005
(0.010) (0.041) (0.005)
Observations 1864 1900 1004
Eff. Number of obs 506 414 349
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.111 0.088 0.137
Robust p-value 0.213 0.840 0.298
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective charac-
teristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico
et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population
threshold, electoral term and region. The data on public school enrollment comes from the Ministry of National
Education (MEN). Data on access to clean water comes from the Public Services Information System (SUI), and
data on the percentage of poor with health insurance comes from the Ministry of Health and Social Protection
(MSPS). Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table A10: Effect of council size on coca cultivation and aerial spraying
Dependent variable: Hectares of
coca aerial spraying
cultivations on coca cult.
(1) (2)
RD Estimate -0.198 -0.127
(0.437) (0.353)
Observations 1900 1900
Eff. Number of obs 537 609
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.115 0.129
Robust p-value 0.688 0.799
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from
Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable.
The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes
fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and region. The data is from
the Center of Studies on Economic Development, which compiled and processed
information provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The
data is available for 2000-2009. Standard errors clustered by municipality are
reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
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Appendix B Omitted Robustness Checks
In this Appendix, I provide additional details about the robustness exercises reported in the text.
Tables B1 to B6 show that the results in Section 4 are robust to a variety of additional specifications.
Table B1 includes controls for previous crime rates. Table B2 uses yearly averages instead of averages
over the electoral period. Table B3 excludes the 20,000 and 100,000 population thresholds (since some
key pre-treatment variables may change discontinuously at these thresholds, or other policies may serve
as confounding factors). Table B4 includes the 2011 and 2015 elections (using the data from the NCHM
described in the footnote 18). All the estimates are consistent with those in Table 3, and many of them
are more precise.
Table B5 examines the robustness of the results in Table 3 to the use of an alternative dependent
variable: the ratio of conflict-related killings to total killings. Notably, the estimates for selective killings
are again negative, statistically significant and more precise than the estimates in Panel C in Table 3.
Table B6 examines whether there is an effect on other types of conflict-related violence. It looks at
combatant deaths and unintended civilian casualties. No estimates are statistically different from zero,
which provides additional evidence that the effect of larger councils on conflict-related violence is specific
to killings that deliberately target civilians.
Table B1: Effect of council size on conflict-related killings: Robustness to controlling for previous
overall homicide rate
Dependent variable: Conflict-related killings
per 100,000 inhabitants
Killing Select. killing Massacre
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate -2.577 -2.790∗∗ -0.020
(1.900) (1.418) (0.928)
Observations 2318 2318 2318
Eff. Number of obs 526 495 500
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.090 0.084 0.085
Robust p-value 0.215 0.072 0.917
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1)
when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All columns
include fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term, region, and the overall
homicide rate lagged one period. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the
algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdro-
bust.ado. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table B2: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence: Robustness to using yearly averages
Dep. variable: Conflict-related homicide
Killing Select. killing Massacre
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Prob.
RD Estimate -0.047∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.003)
Observations 7128 7128 7128
Eff. Number of obs 2066 1909 1582
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.117 0.107 0.090
Robust p-value 0.000 0.000 0.094
Panel B: Number
RD Estimate -1.177∗∗ -1.082∗∗∗ -0.048
(0.493) (0.298) (0.219)
Observations 7128 7128 7128
Eff. Number of obs 1604 1552 2010
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.091 0.087 0.113
Robust p-value 0.015 0.001 0.800
Panel C: Rate
RD Estimate -3.526∗∗ -4.068∗∗∗ 0.157
(1.616) (1.075) (0.738)
Observations 7128 7128 7128
Eff. Number of obs 1567 1391 1552
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.088 0.078 0.087
Robust p-value 0.035 0.000 0.667
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1)
when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The dependent
variable in panel A is the average over the years following an election of a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the particular type of killing is observed in a municipality in a quarter of
a year. The dependent variable in panels B and C is the average of the total number
of killings and killings per 100,000 people, respectively. The bandwidth (h) is chosen
optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by
the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, year
and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table B3: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence: Robustness to excluding
the 20,000 and 100,000 thresholds
Dep. variable: Prob. of conflict-related:
Killing Select. killing Massacre
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Excluding 20,000 threshold
RD Estimate -0.061∗ -0.055∗ -0.015
(0.032) (0.031) (0.010)
Observations 683 683 683
Eff. Number of obs 221 203 152
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.130 0.121 0.088
Robust p-value 0.072 0.124 0.108
Panel B: Excluding 100,000 threshold
RD Estimate -0.037∗∗ -0.032∗ -0.005
(0.019) (0.017) (0.006)
Observations 1743 1743 1743
Eff. Number of obs 537 551 411
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.126 0.128 0.096
Robust p-value 0.071 0.096 0.397
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when
the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen
optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the
command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term
(or year) and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table B4: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence: NCHM data and 1997-
2018 period
Dependent variable: Conflict-related homicide Overall
Killing Select. killing Massacre homicide
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: prob.
RD Estimate -0.002 -0.070∗∗ -0.005 0.012
(0.004) (0.033) (0.005) (0.019)
Observations 2822 2822 2822 2817
Eff. Number of obs 855 656 755 563
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.117 0.091 0.103 0.078
Robust p-value 0.658 0.051 0.326 0.436
Panel B: number
RD Estimate -2.226 -2.156 -0.070 -3.797
(1.772) (1.718) (0.088) (3.085)
Observations 2822 2822 2822 2817
Eff. Number of obs 636 636 631 704
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.096
Robust p-value 0.239 0.243 0.402 0.242
Panel C: rate
RD Estimate -1.047 -1.020 -0.027 -4.420
(5.553) (5.402) (0.245) (7.716)
Observations 2822 2822 2822 2810
Eff. Number of obs 776 776 782 783
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.109
Robust p-value 0.863 0.863 0.961 0.563
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when
the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The dependent variable in
panel A is the average over the electoral term of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the particular
type of killing is observed in a municipality in a quarter of a year. The dependent variable in
panels B and C is the average of the total number of killings and killings per 100,000 people,
respectively. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for
population threshold, electoral term and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table B5: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence: Robustness to the use of
the ratio of conflict-related killings to total killings
Dependent variable: Ratio of conflict-related killings
to total killings
Killing Select. killing Massacre
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate -0.033 -0.054∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.028) (0.019) (0.023)
Observations 2311 2311 2311
Eff. Number of obs 504 392 763
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.087 0.069 0.130
Robust p-value 0.126 0.005 0.616
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from
Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All
columns include fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and region.
The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado. Standard errors
clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table B6: Effect of council size on other types of conflict-related violence
Dep. variable:
Combatant deaths Unintended civilian casualties
Occurrence Number Rate Occurrence Number Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RD Estimate 0.001 0.058 0.180 0.000 0.043 0.052
(0.002) (0.067) (0.194) (0.003) (0.067) (0.206)
Observations 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900
Eff. Number of obs 624 491 406 626 501 355
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.131 0.105 0.086 0.132 0.107 0.075
Robust p-value 0.400 0.377 0.341 0.960 0.481 0.605
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic
is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold,
electoral term (or year) and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Tables B7 to B9 provide suplemental robustness checks to the results in Section 5.1.
Table B7 repeats the analysis in Table 4 distinguishing between two groups of municipalities
according to their closest population thresholds; the estimates show that the effect is slightly
greater for the group with a population closest to the larger thresholds. Table B8 shows that
the estimates in Table 5 are robust to the use of the alternative definition of paramilitary-
linked and left-wing parties mentioned in the notes of Tables A7 and A8. The estimates are
similar to those in Table 5. Table B9 shows that the results in Table 6 are robust to using
yearly averages instead of averages over the electoral period.
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Table B10 and Figure B1 provide suplemental robustness checks to the results in Section
5.2. Table B10 shows that a larger council does not affect the probability of electing a mayor
from any group I have already defined. Figure B1 shows that a systematic manipulation
of the electoral results around the zero paramilitary margin of victory threshold within
normalized population windows of 10% or 20% is unlikely.
Table B7: Effect of council size on number of parties on council (by group of thresh-
olds)
Dependent variable:
# of parties # of non-traditional
on council parties on council
(1) (2)
Panel A: 20,000 and 50,000 thresholds
RD Estimate 0.967∗ 0.864∗
(0.494) (0.498)
Observations 1635 1635
Eff. Number of obs 364 328
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.090 0.080
Robust p-value 0.078 0.104
Panel B: 100,000, 250,000 and 1,000,000 thresholds
RD Estimate 1.076∗∗ 0.834∗
(0.506) (0.477)
Observations 265 265
Eff. Number of obs 48 51
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.076 0.083
Robust p-value 0.072 0.212
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when
the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen
optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the com-
mand rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and region.
Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table B8: Effect of council size on success of different parties: Robustness to using an
alternative definition of paramilitary-linked and left-wing party
Dependent variable: Presence on council of a
Paramilitary- Left-wing Paramilitary-linked
linked party party and a left-wing party
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate 0.241∗∗∗ -0.015 0.196∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.075) (0.074)
Observations 1900 1900 1900
Eff. Number of obs 391 580 357
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.083 0.125 0.076
Robust p-value 0.005 0.937 0.009
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective
characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm
by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects
for population threshold, electoral term and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table B9: Effect of council size on armed conflict: Robustness to using yearly averages
Dependent variable: Presence of violent actions by
Any group Guerrillas Paramilitaries
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate -0.152∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.035
(0.047) (0.052) (0.036)
Observations 5765 5765 5765
Eff. Number of obs 827 879 1215
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.058 0.062 0.086
Robust p-value 0.001 0.003 0.246
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective character-
istic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al.
(2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold,
year and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table B10: Effect of council size on mayor’s party
Dependent variable: Mayor from a
Paramilitary- Left-wing Liberal or Con-
linked party party servative party
(1) (2) (3)
RD Estimate 0.033 -0.050 -0.134
(0.040) (0.047) (0.093)
Observations 1900 1900 1900
Eff. Number of obs 343 357 525
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.073 0.076 0.113
Robust p-value 0.691 0.287 0.167
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective
characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm
by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects
for population threshold, electoral term and region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Figure B1: Manipulation tests for margin of victory of paramilitary-linked parties in
small windows for normalized population
(a) Window for normalized pop.: 10% (b) Window for normalized pop.: 20%
All figures pool all years, and show finely-gridded histograms of the margin of victory of paramilitary-linked
parties using local linear regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the
margin of victory (see McCrary, 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2018a). Each figure uses data only around the
corresponding population threshold. The estimates of the difference in the height at the threshold and
robust manipulation p-values (as implemented in Stata by the command rddensity.ado, (see Cattaneo et al.,
2018a), are: (a) -0.034 (s.e. 0.346) and p-value=0.990; (b) -0.182 (s.e. 0.279) and p-value=0.860.
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Appendix C Robustness to excluding the creation of mu-
nicipalities
In this appendix, I explore the robustness of the main results to excluding events in which a municipal-
ity was either created or gave part of its population to a new municipality. During the period considered,
no municipality disappeared. As discussed in footnote 23, when a municipality is created, the data used
in the estimation of the population of the municipalities involved in the event may be systematically
manipulated.
Between 1997 and 2011, in municipalities with a population of at least 15,000 (i.e. 564 municipalities),
there were 2,355 local elections. Simultaneously to these elections (i.e. within a two-year window) there
were 32 events in which a municipality was either created or lost part of its territory. These events are
reported in Table C1.
Table C1: Municipalities created or that lost part of their territory between 1997-2011
Type Year Year of
ID Municipality (Name/Department) of event of event closest election
13600 Rio Viejo (Bol´ıvar) Loss of terr. 2007 2007
19100 Bol´ıva (Cauca) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
19698 Santander de Quilichao (Cauca) Loss of terr. 1998 1997
23466 Montel´ıbano (Co´rdoba) Loss of terr. 2007 2007
23670 San Andre´s de Sotavento (Co´rdoba) Loss of terr. 2007 2007
27001 Quibdo´ (Choco´) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
27073 Bagado´ (Choco´) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
27205 Condoto (Choco´) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
27361 Istmina (Choco´) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
27615 Riosucio (Choco´) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
27787 Tado´ (Choco´) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
44078 Barrancas (La Guajira) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
44430 Maicao (La Guajira) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
47030 Algarrobo (Magdalena) creation 1999 2000
47058 Ariguan´ı (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
47170 Chivolo (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
47189 Cie´naga (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
47205 Concordia (Magdalena) creation 1999 2000
47258 El Pin˜o´n (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
47288 Fundacio´n (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
47460 Nueva Granada (Magdalena) creation 2000 2000
47551 Pivijay (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
47555 Plato (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
47707 Santa Ana (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
47798 Tenerife (Magdalena) Loss of terr. 2000 2000
47980 Zona Bananera (Magdalena) creation 1999 2000
52001 Pasto (Narin˜o) Loss of terr. 1999 2000
52260 El Tambo (Narin˜o) Loss of terr. 1998 1997
70215 Corozal (Sucre) Loss of terr. 1998 1997
70678 San Benito Abad (Sucre) Loss of terr. 1998 1997
70742 Since´ (Sucre) Loss of terr. 1998 1997
70820 Santiago de Tolu´ (Sucre) Loss of terr. 2002 2003
Notes: This table lists all the events between 1997 and 2011 in which a Colombian municipality with a population of
at least 15,000 was created or split (during this period no municipality disappeared). The table uses data from Chavarro
(2013).
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Figure C1 and Table C2 exclude from the baseline sample the events listed in Table C1. Figure C1
reports the McCrary’s and Cattaneo et al.’s tests for each population threshold and pooled thresholds.
The figure provides evidence against the existence of systematic manipulation of the population at the
thresholds. Table C2 repeats the analysis in Table 3, which include the main results of the paper. All
the estimates in Table C2 are virtually the same as those in Table 3. This shows that the results of
Table 3 are robust to the existence of events in which the population of a municipality changes due to
the municipality’s creation or splitting.
Figure C1: Manipulation tests excluding events in which a municipality was created
(a) Pooled thresholds
(b) 20,000 threshold (c) 50,000 threshold
(d) 100,000 threshold (e) 250,000 threshold
All figures pool all years and exclude the events listed in Table C1. The figures show finely-gridded histograms of the
population smoothed using local linear regression, separately on either side of the cutoff of the density function of the
population. Figures in panels (b) to (e) use data only around the corresponding population threshold. The estimates of
the difference in the height at the threshold and robust manipulation p-values (as implemented in Stata by the command
rddensity.ado, (see Cattaneo et al., 2018a), are: (a) 0.070 (s.e. 0.115) and p-value 0.369; (b) 0.084 (s.e. 0.150) and p-value
0.161; (c) 0.0823 (s.e. 0.279) and p-value 0.674; (d) -0.118 (s.e. 0.374) and p-value 0.862; (e) 0.072 (s.e. 0.497) and p-value
0.066.
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Table C2: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence: Robustness to excluding events in
which a municipality was created
Dependent variable: Conflict-related homicide Overall
Killing Select. killing Massacre homicide
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: prob.
RD Estimate -0.044∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.006 0.012
(0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.021)
Observations 2323 2323 2323 2294
Eff. Number of obs 722 639 588 437
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.122 0.109 0.099 0.076
Robust p-value 0.013 0.018 0.182 0.419
Panel B: number
RD Estimate -1.092 -0.923∗ -0.131 -3.679
(0.713) (0.471) (0.293) (4.078)
Observations 2323 2323 2323 2294
Eff. Number of obs 570 554 663 601
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.096 0.095 0.113 0.103
Robust p-value 0.131 0.068 0.657 0.420
Panel C: rate
RD Estimate -3.153 -3.123∗ -0.091 -5.383
(2.406) (1.750) (1.003) (9.571)
Observations 2323 2323 2323 2287
Eff. Number of obs 592 584 621 623
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.100 0.099 0.105 0.108
Robust p-value 0.204 0.082 0.946 0.641
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the
respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All columns exclude the events listed
in Table C1. The dependent variable in panel A is the average over the electoral term of a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the particular type of killing is observed in a municipality in a quarter of
a year. The dependent variable in panels B and C is the average of the total number of killings
and killings per 100,000 people, respectively. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the
algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado,
and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and region. Standard errors
clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%.
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Appendix D Additional Evidence for the Preferred Mech-
anism
To further examine the plausibility of my deterrence hypothesis, this appendix contains several addi-
tional exercises based on certain key consequences. Specifically, I examine whether the impact of a larger
municipal council on selective violence is affected by the degree to which the municipality was contested
militarily in the past. I hypothesize that the effect of an exogenous increase in the influence of politicians
with paramilitary links (as a consequence of a larger municipal council) on selective killings is amplified
in areas that have been more military contested.
I use two proxies for the degree to which municipalities were contested. First, I look at past occurrences
of violence by both guerrillas and paramilitaries. Specifically, I compute the proportion of years in which
both a guerrilla and paramilitary group perpetrated a violent act in the municipality (using CERAC
data), and define a dummy variable equal to 1 for those municipalities with a proportion higher than
the median (which I interpret as highly contested), and zero for those with proportion below the median
(which I interpret as relatively uncontested). Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A in Table D1 examine how
the results in Section 4 are affected when we distinguish between highly contested municipalities (column
(1)) and relatively uncontested municipalities (column (2)). Consistent with the deterrence hypothesis,
the table shows that the effect of a larger council size on conflict-related killings is concentrated in highly
contested municipalities.49, 50
A second proxy is mass forced displacement. By 2005, approximately 7% of the Colombian population
had been forcibly displaced. All armed groups deliberately triggered the forced migration of civilians,
which increased the resources of these armed groups and hampered their enemies’ fighting capacity (see
Ibanez and Velez, 2008). Paramilitary groups instigated half of all forced migrations, while guerrilla
groups and the simultaneous presence of two armed groups were responsible for 20% and 22% of such
migrations, respectively (see Ibanez and Velez, 2008). I construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if a
municipality experienced a mass forced migration in a given year. I compute the average for the period
in which data exists, and define a dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities with a proportion higher
than this average (which I interpret as highly contested), and 0 for those with a proportion below the
average (which I interpreted as relatively uncontested). Approximately 28.7% of observations are classified
as highly contested. Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A in Table D1 show results that are also consistent
with the deterrence hypothesis: the effect of a large council on conflict-related killings is concentrated in
49Table D2 uses a parametric specification to explore robustness to using the extensive margin. The table
reports estimates for two bandwidths (0.10) and (0.15), which are close to Calonico et al.’s endogenously chosen
bandwidths in the baseline specifications. The table also reports results for specifications with linear and quadratic
polynomials. Columns (1) and (6) examine whether the results in Table 3 are robust to using a variety of parametric
specifications. The estimates in these columns are virtually the same as those in Table 3. Columns (2) and (7) in
Table D2 introduce an interaction term between the dummy for a larger council size and the dummy previously
described for highly contested municipalities. Columns (3) and (8) replace the dummy with the intensive margin
variable (i.e. share of years the municipality has been contested). The estimates of the interaction term are always
negative and statistically significant, which confirms the results in columns (1) and (2) of panel A in Table D1.
50Columns (1) and (2) of panel B in Table D1 examine whether the effect of a larger council on paramilitary-
linked representation is concentrated in highly contested municipalities. The estimates show this is not the case.
These results, combined with those in panel A, imply that even though paramilitary groups may have had greater
influence in municipalities with larger councils that were not contested in the past, this influence only reduces
guerrilla attacks in municipalities that were contested militarily in the past.
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municipalities with significant previous exposure to forced migration.51, 52
Table D1: Effect of council size on conflict-related violence in highly disputed municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dependent variable: Occurrence of a killing
Frequent Infrequent Frequent Infrequent
past violent past violent past forced past forced
actions actions displacement displacement
RD Estimate -0.064∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.087∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.024) (0.013) (0.030) (0.019)
Observations 1303 1052 770 1585
Eff. Number of obs 345 360 164 413
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.101 0.133 0.083 0.104
Robust p-value 0.010 0.210 0.003 0.521
Panel B: Dependent variable: Presence on council of a paramilitary-linked party
Frequent Infrequent Frequent Infrequent
past violent past violent past forced past forced
actions actions displacement displacement
RD Estimate 0.304∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(0.085) (0.115) (0.120) (0.090)
Observations 1303 1052 770 1585
Eff. Number of obs 367 200 178 408
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 0.110 0.075 0.089 0.103
Robust p-value 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.041
Notes: All columns report the RD estimates of having a larger council from Eq. (1) when the respective characteristic is
used as the dependent variable. The bandwidth (h) is chosen optimally using the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014b) as
implemented in Stata by the command rdrobust.ado, and includes fixed effects for population threshold, electoral term and
region. Standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%
51Columns (4), (5), (9) and (10) in Table D2 in Web Appendix A explore robustness to using the intensive margin
and a parametric specification (see footnote 49). As is the case for contested municipalities, the estimates in these
columns are consistent with those in columns (3) and (4) of Panel A in Table D1.
52Columns (3) and (4) of Panel B in Table D1 examine whether the effect of a larger council on the representation of
paramilitary-linked parties is concentrated in municipalities with frequent past forced displacement. The estimates
show this is not the case.
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